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I. INTRODUCTION 
In concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a 
right of same-sex couples to marry, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for 
the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges was avowedly non-originalist in 
its promotion of the idea that changing societal norms can lead to 
the evolution of constitutional meaning.1  But if the original 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment had been the Court’s 
guide, would it have concluded that state bans on same-sex 
marriage are unconstitutional?  To Justice Scalia, the answer was 
clear: “When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868,” he 
reasoned, “every State limited marriage to one man and one 
woman, and no one doubted the constitutionality of doing so.  That 
resolves these cases.”2   
But asking how the framers of the Amendment would have 
answered the specific question about same-sex marriage, had it 
been put to them, is not the only plausible way to address the 
question of the Amendment’s original meaning.  We could instead 
ask whether the framers understood the Amendment to protect a 
fundamental right to marry, abstracting out the particular status 
or identity of the two people who seek to exercise the right.  Or we 
could ask whether the Amendment would objectively have been 
understood to incorporate a principle prohibiting all “caste-like” 
discrimination,3 which in turn would necessitate consideration of 
whether discrimination against gays and lesbians is such a form of 
discrimination (which we might answer either in light of or in 
spite of the framers’ intuitions about that question).  Or we could 
ask whether the Amendment’s original objective meaning was to 
mandate “equality,” an objectively capacious concept that might 
forbid discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation today, even 
if it would not have in 1868.4 
                                                                                                               
 1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“The generations that wrote and 
ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the 
extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a 
charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.”). 
 2 Id. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 3 See infra notes 169–182 and accompanying text. 
 4 See infra notes 172–177 and accompanying text. 
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Whether originalism requires the conclusion that bans on same-
sex marriage violate the Fourteenth Amendment depends on 
which of these questions we ask.  (And these questions, it turns 
out, are just a few of the many plausible ways to frame the 
inquiry.)  The lower the level of generality at which we ask the 
question—for example, did the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment believe (or intend or expect) that the Amendment 
would prohibit bans on same-sex marriage—the more likely it is 
that the answer will be that bans on same-sex marriage are 
consistent with the original meaning.  And the higher the level of 
generality at which we ask the question—for example, did the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporate an “anti-caste” principle, or 
did the Fourteenth Amendment require “equality” more 
generally—the more likely it is that the answer will be that bans 
on same-sex marriage are inconsistent with the original meaning.   
The same is true for other contested questions of constitutional 
law.  Did the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understand it 
to prohibit laws interfering with a woman’s right to use birth 
control or to obtain an abortion?  Almost certainly not.  But would 
a hypothetical, reasonable, well-informed person in 1868 have 
understood the Fourteenth Amendment to offer protection for 
personal autonomy in matters of family and child rearing?  Likely 
so.  And that broadly (and vaguely) defined right, when applied to 
specific circumstances in a modern context, might embrace (and 
therefore protect) the decision about whether to use contraception 
or to obtain an abortion.  The selection of the level of generality at 
which we ask the question essentially foreordains the answer.5  
We could go through this exercise for the permissibility of race-
based affirmative action by state institutions;6 the 
constitutionality of restrictions on corporate expenditures designed 
                                                                                                               
 5 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 358 
(1992) (“Movements in the level of constitutional generality may be used to justify almost 
any outcome.”). 
 6 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause does 
not prohibit the law school’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further 
a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student 
body.”).  
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to influence the outcomes of elections;7 and countless other 
controversial questions of constitutional law. 
It is, of course, not universally accepted that the appropriate 
inquiry, in determining constitutional meaning, is to seek the 
document’s original meaning.8  But even if there were broad 
agreement that the proper way to interpret the Constitution is to 
seek its original meaning, constitutional questions would be 
heavily contested because we would have to decide whether to seek 
that meaning at a high level of specificity or, conversely, at a high 
level of generality.   
Yet the Constitution does not give any clear guidance about 
how to decide the correct level of generality at which to read its 
provisions.9  Instead, originalists must have a theory about how to 
select the correct level of generality for ascertaining constitutional 
meaning.   
The “old originalism”—that is, the original-intent originalism of 
Edwin Meese, Raoul Berger, and (originally) Robert Bork—tended 
to have such a theory, even if its proponents did not always apply 
it with perfect consistency.10  Notwithstanding the broad terms in 
which many of the Constitution’s rights-granting provisions are 
framed, the old originalism generally sought constitutional 
meaning at a low level of generality.11  Proponents of the old 
originalism contended that it was simply implausible to believe 
that the framers intended to authorize unelected judges to find, in 
the Constitution’s vague and open-ended provisions, specific rights 
                                                                                                               
 7 See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (“No 
sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of non-profit or for-
profit corporations.”). 
 8 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852 (1989) 
(“[O]riginalism is not, and had perhaps never been, the sole method of constitutional 
exegesis.”). 
 9 See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of 
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990) (“The selection of a level of generality 
necessarily involves value choices.”). 
 10 See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 
(2004) (noting the prominence of the old originalism in the 1960s through the 1980s). 
 11 See Raoul Berger, Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L. 
REV. 350, 352–53 (1988) (criticizing as illegitimate any effort to “read general words in 
disregard of the specific intention[s]”); id. at 351. 
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not explicitly mentioned in the text.12  This approach usually 
resolved claims of constitutional rights against the existence of the 
right;13 if the question, after all, is whether the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (or the Fifth Amendment) specifically 
intended the Constitution to protect the right of a woman to use 
contraception or to obtain an abortion, for example, the question 
pretty much answers itself. 
The old originalism “was as much a normative theory of the 
proper judicial role as it was a semantic theory of textual 
interpretation.”14  Its primary professed commitment was to 
judicial constraint—preventing judges from imposing their 
personal policy preferences under the guise of interpretation—and 
judicial restraint—requiring judges, in most cases, to defer to 
legislative majorities.15  The old originalism tended to advance 
these goals, at least in theory, by limiting the circumstances under 
which judges could displace the decisions of democratically 
accountable actors.16  If constitutional rights are defined more 
narrowly, then there is less opportunity for judges to invalidate 
government action in the name of individual rights.  And the old 
originalism, which erred strongly on the side of declining to find 
specific rights in the Constitution’s broadly worded rights-granting 
provisions, not surprisingly would have resulted in a more narrow 
range of protected rights.17  
But as an approach for ascertaining constitutional meaning, the 
old originalism suffered from serious problems, both theoretical 
and practical.  Given the number of potential “framers” (itself an 
                                                                                                               
 12 See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 116–31 (1977); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: 
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 180–85 (1990). 
 13 See Whittington, supra note 10, at 601 (“Above all, originalism was a way of explaining 
what the Court had done wrong, and what it had done in this context was primarily to 
strike down government actions in the name of individual rights.”). 
 14 See Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 10, at 602; Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. 
Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 156–59 (2015). 
 15 See Colby & Smith, supra note 14, at 584–85 (noting old originalism’s commitment to 
judicial restraint and judicial deference to the legislature); Whittington, supra note 10, at 
602 (describing old originalism’s focus on limiting judicial discretion and promoting judicial 
deference to the legislature). 
 16 See Whittington, supra note 10, at 602 (explaining that old originalists were “primarily 
concerned with empowering popular majorities”). 
 17 See infra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
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uncertain category), it is perhaps impossible to ascertain one 
single, collective intent, particularly when one seeks the subjective 
intentions of the framers;18 and, in any event, given the framers’ 
views about interpretation, original-intent originalism likely was 
self-defeating.19  The old originalism was also susceptible to the 
charge that, by almost religiously adhering to the specific 
preferences of men who lived long ago, it was simply a device to 
impose substantively conservative values under the guise of 
neutral interpretation.  In addition, if original intent, defined at a 
low level of generality, was the benchmark for constitutional 
meaning, then the approach not only did a poor job of explaining 
existing doctrine,20 but also would have led, if faithfully followed, 
to untenable results—such as the conclusion that Brown v. Board 
of Education21 was incorrectly decided.22  
The “new originalism,”23 which ostensibly is the dominant 
approach among originalists today, arose as a response to criticism 
of the old originalism.  Although it is difficult to generalize, given 
the range of current originalist theories,24 the new originalism 
generally eschews the subjective intent of the framers and instead 
seeks the original, objective meaning of the constitutional text.   
                                                                                                               
 18 See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204, 209–22 (1980) (discussing the difficulty of pinpointing the specific intent to 
adopters); Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 720 
(2011) (“[C]ritics charged that it is often impossible to uncover a single collective intent of 
the Framers as a whole, insofar as different Framers were often motivated by different 
intentions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 19 See Colby, supra note 18, at 720 (“Critics also argued that original intent is a self-
defeating philosophy.  The historical evidence shows that the Framers intended for future 
generations not to interpret the Constitution according to the intent of the Framers; as 
such, in order to follow the intent of the Framers, one must not follow the intent of the 
Framers.”); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 885, 948 (1984) (“It is commonly assumed that the ‘interpretive intention’ of the 
Constitution's framers was that the Constitution would be construed in accordance with 
what future interpreters could gather of the framers' own purposes, expectations, and 
intentions. Inquiry shows that assumption to be incorrect.”).  
 20 See Brest, supra note 18, at 223 (“Strict originalism cannot accommodate most modern 
decisions under the Bill of Rights of fourteenth amendment.”). 
 21 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 22 See infra notes 41–63 and accompanying text. 
 23 See Whittington, supra note 10, at 607–08 (examining new originalist theory). 
 24 See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 256–62 
(2009) (discussing the range of originalist theories). 
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The new originalism is based in significant part on the premise 
that to interpret text is, by definition, to seek the original meaning 
of the text.25  It thus is as much a semantic theory of 
interpretation as it is a normative theory of the judicial role.26  As 
such, the new originalism is not single-mindedly driven, as was 
the old originalism, by a commitment to judicial restraint.  As 
Keith Whittington has explained, “[t]he new originalism does not 
require judges to get out of the way of legislatures.  It requires 
judges to uphold the original Constitution—nothing more, but also 
nothing less.”27  In contrast to the old originalism, the “primary 
virtue claimed by the new originalism is one of constitutional 
fidelity, not of judicial restraint or democratic majoritarianism.”28  
As a consequence, many new originalists have abandoned the old 
originalism’s refusal to acknowledge the possibility that the 
Constitution ought to be read at a high level of abstraction.  After 
all, if fidelity to the original meaning of the text, rather than 
judicial restraint, is the operative principle, then we might have to 
interpret provisions that are written in objectively broad terms to 
have a broad sweep and application.  Accordingly, new originalists 
do not insist that we should always seek constitutional meaning at 
the lowest possible level of generality, by reference to the specific 
expectations of the framers.   
But in accepting that not every question of constitutional law 
can be resolved by seeking the specific understanding of the 
framers at the lowest possible level of generality, the new 
originalism creates a significant problem: once the new originalist 
                                                                                                               
 25 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 
1825–26 (1997) (“[T]he presumptive meaning of a [document] is its original public 
meaning.”). 
 26 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, Ill. Pub. L. & Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series No. 07-24, Nov. 2008, at 30 (“What words mean is one thing; what 
we should do about their meaning is another.”). 
 27 Whittington, supra note 10, at 609. 
 28 Id.  See also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (Scalia, J.) (“[T]he 
enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table,” 
and “it is . . . the role of th[e] Court” to enforce those rights, as originally understood, 
against modern legislative interference); Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No 
Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 
1551, 1562 (2012) (arguing that true originalism does “not worry about judicial restraint”). 
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departs from the lowest level of generality, how does she decide at 
which level of generality to seek constitutional meaning?  
Most of the new originalists who have addressed the question 
have concluded that the appropriate inquiry is to seek the level of 
generality at which the text of a constitutional provision would 
have been objectively understood by the reasonable, hypothetical 
observer at the time that the provision was adopted.29  Because 
many of the most contested provisions of the Constitution—
including the central rights-granting clauses—are framed in 
broad, abstract terms, this approach inevitably should lead the 
originalist to seek the original meaning of those provisions at a 
high level of generality.30  And because the original meaning at a 
high level of generality cannot, by itself, resolve most contested 
questions of constitutional law today, many new originalists have 
contended that we must instead engage in the process of 
“construction”—the creation of rules of decision that are 
“consistent with” the original meaning, “but not deducible from 
it.”31  On most accounts, construction necessarily requires judicial 
creativity to apply the Constitution’s broad commands to concrete 
circumstances, as it is a process that, by definition, is “outside the 
                                                                                                               
 29 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 427, 488 (2007) (“But if what matters to us is the original meaning of the text, 
then the principles underlying the constitutional text should be as general as the text 
itself.”); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 644 
(1999) (“[D]etermining original meanings entails determining the level of generality with 
which a particular term was used.”); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of 
Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 23 (2006) (“[O]riginal public meaning 
originalism attempts to identify the level of generality in which the Constitution is 
objectively expressed.”); Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial 
Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1269, 1280 (1997) (“A genuine commitment to the semantic intentions of the 
Framers requires the interpreter to seek the level of generality at which the particular 
language was understood by the its Framers.”).  
 30 See McConnell, supra note 29, at 1281 (“It is perfectly possible that . . . the interpreter 
would discover that some provisions of the Constitution were understood at a high level of 
generality . . . .”); Whittington, supra note 10, at 611 (noting that the founders may have 
intended abstract principles that left discretion to future decision makers). 
 31 RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 121 (2004) [hereinafter BARNETT, RESTORING]; see also Randy E. Barnett, 
Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as it Sounds, 22 CONST. 
COMMENT. 257, 265 (2005) [hereinafter Barnett, Trumping Precedent]. 
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domain of originalism as a theory of constitutional 
interpretation.”32 
The new originalism addresses many of the theoretical flaws of 
the old originalism, but only by creating the very problem that the 
old originalism was designed to address.  The old originalism 
purported to prevent the unconstrained judicial creativity that can 
follow from seeking the original meaning of the Constitution’s 
provisions at a high level of generality.  But because many new 
originalists recognize that many of the Constitution’s most 
important provisions should be understood at a high level of 
generality, and approve of the process of judicial construction to 
apply those general, abstract principles to concrete cases, there is 
significant room for instrumental decision making.33  In addition, 
if we faithfully apply this approach—ascertaining the broad 
principles that underlie the constitutional text and then seeking to 
apply them to problems today, often in ways that the framers 
                                                                                                               
 32 Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 923, 967 (2009); see BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 121 (“[C]onstitutional 
construction can be constrained by original meaning while not entirely determined by 
it . . . .”); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 453, 457 (2013) [hereinafter Solum, Construction] (discussing the difference between 
interpretation and construction); infra notes 248–254 and accompanying text.  Though most 
new originalists seem to acknowledge the need for construction, not all originalists writing 
today agree with this modification to the old originalism.  See generally John O. McGinnis & 
Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737 [hereinafter 
McGinnis & Rappaport, Abstract Meaning] (criticizing those who conclude that possibly 
abstract language has an abstract meaning without sufficiently considering the alternative 
possibilities); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A 
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 
(2009) (advocating a theory of constitutional interpretation based on the interpretive 
principles of the framers).  See also Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism (UNIV. OF 
SAN DIEGO SCH. OF L. LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, Paper No. 08-0671 (2008) 
(“[G]iven what we accept as legally authoritative, the proper way to interpret the 
Constitution . . . is to seek its authors’ intended meanings. . . .”); Steven D. Smith, That Old-
Time Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM 223 (2011) (Grant Hushcraft & 
Bradley W. Miller eds.) (attempting a defense of old originalism).  In addition, although 
Keith Whittington acknowledges the need for construction, he argues that it should not be 
conceived as a task for the judiciary.  See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION 204–06 (1999).   
 33 See Colby, supra note 18, at 752–64 (arguing that new originalism does not constrain 
judicial decision making); Colby & Smith, supra note 24, at 305 (“[O]riginalists’ claims that 
originalism is likely to be overwhelmingly better than its alternatives at constraining 
judicial discretion are substantially overblown.”). 
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could not have anticipated—then there is no obvious distinction 
between originalism and non-originalism.34    
Perhaps more important, it is fair to wonder whether this 
approach has been consistently and conscientiously followed; 
originalists often seem to vary the level of generality at which they 
seek constitutional meaning in a way that cannot be explained 
simply by reference to the level of generality at which the 
constitutional text is expressed.  Indeed, in practice the decision 
appears ad hoc, largely unconstrained, and thus susceptible to the 
same kind of results-oriented decision-making that originalists 
have long decried.  The choice of the level of generality at which to 
seek constitutional meaning—by academic originalists and, 
perhaps more troubling, by judges purporting to follow an 
originalist approach—varies from issue to issue and case to case, 
often with no neutral principle to explain the choice.  The problem 
of the level of generality, in other words, has in practice 
undermined the core originalist claim that it is a neutral approach 
that effectively constrains the interpreter.  
To be fair, this is not a problem that is unique to originalists; 
non-originalists have also long grappled with the problem of 
selecting a level of generality and the risk that doing so will simply 
be a guise to produce desired results.35  The problem of the level of 
generality in textual interpretation will be with us for as long as 
we use words to capture complex ideas, with the hope that they 
will apply to new and unforeseen circumstances.  But it might pose 
a particular problem for proponents of the new originalism, who 
                                                                                                               
 34 See Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62 
HASTINGS L.J. 707, 707 (2011). 
 35 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131–49 (1977) (discussing the 
varying approaches to interpreting vague constitutional provisions); Bruce Ackerman, 
Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 318 (1992) (noting that the Court is eager to 
interpret the power-granting provisions of the Constitution at a high level of abstraction 
while interpreting rights-granting provisions narrowly); Paul Brest, The Fundamental 
Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 
90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1091 (1981) (arguing that Bork’s adoption of a principle in interpreting 
the Equal Protection Clause demands an arbitrary choice among levels of abstraction); 
Brest, supra note 18, at 217 (“The extent to which a clause may be properly interpreted to 
reach outcomes different from those actually contemplated by the adopters depends on the 
relationship between a general principle and its exemplary applications.”); Tribe & Dorf, 
supra note 9, at 1058 (“The selection of a level of generality necessarily involves value 
choices.”). 
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maintain, as did proponents of the old originalism, that their 
approach is the only genuinely objective and neutral approach to 
constitutional interpretation.36  To the extent that both the appeal 
and the normative justification for originalism lies in such claims, 
the new originalism’s willingness to permit judges to seek the 
original meaning at a high level of generality risks significantly 
undermining both the appeal and the justification for the 
approach.   
The problem of the level of generality is central to the challenge 
that faces the new originalism, and central to understanding why 
originalism cannot fulfill its promise to provide a genuinely 
neutral approach to constitutional interpretation that largely 
avoids the pitfalls of judicial subjectivity that are thought to infect 
non-originalist approaches to interpretation.37  My objective in this 
Essay is to demonstrate just how intractable the problem is.  The 
problem is not simply theoretical; it is practical, as the choice of 
level of generality is an essential predicate to any effort to assign 
meaning to the constitutional text.  Accordingly, in this Essay, I 
demonstrate the practical problem by providing examples of efforts 
by originalists—both new, old, and in-between—to select the level 
of generality when seeking to answer concrete questions of 
constitutional law. 
I do not seek to provide a comprehensive survey of the role that 
the level of generality plays in the use and treatment of 
originalism by judges and scholars.  Such an effort would be 
daunting; originalism has played a more prominent role in 
Supreme Court decision making in recent years, largely because of 
the influence of Justice Scalia, and there has been an explosion in 
scholarship about originalism and scholarship seeking to apply 
                                                                                                               
 36 See Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and 
Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2415 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE 
LIBERTY (2005)) (arguing that “in principle” originalism “supplies an objective basis for 
judgment that does not merely reflect the judge’s own ideological stance,” whereas 
“constitutional interpretation based on the judge’s own assessment of worthy purposes and 
propitious consequences lacks that objectivity”); accord Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and 
Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 286 (1996) (“Originalists 
tend to ground their arguments primarily on a foundation of legitimacy.”).  
 37 See David A. Strauss, Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2012) 
(“If we are allowed to change the level of generality at which we characterize the original 
understandings, then originalism can justify anything.”). 
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originalist methods to specific questions of constitutional law.  My 
goal is more modest: to provide enough examples, from judges and 
scholars professing to engage in an originalist inquiry, to make 
clear that the selection of the level of generality is essential to 
constitutional interpretation, yet largely unguided by any coherent 
and neutral theory of selection.  As it turns out, it doesn’t require 
very many examples to make the case. 
II.  THE PROBLEM OF BROWN 
I start with a doozy—originalists’ treatment of the Court’s 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.38  I begin with Brown not 
because it is a typical case (far from it), but rather because it 
frames perfectly the conundrum that originalists face in selecting 
the appropriate level of generality at which to seek constitutional 
meaning.  The conventional view among legal historians has long 
been that Brown cannot be reconciled with the original 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The evidence for 
the conventional view is extensive, but for present purposes it 
suffices to note the broad strokes of the argument.   
Before it issued its decision, the Court in Brown requested 
reargument on “the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868,” including “consideration of the 
Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing 
practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and 
opponents of the Amendment.”39  Notwithstanding the Court’s 
conclusion that these sources were at best “inconclusive,”40 most of 
the prominent legal historians—both those who self-identify as 
originalists41 and those who do not42—who have considered the 
                                                                                                               
 38 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 39 Id. at 489. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 12, at 119–30 (arguing that the framers did not intend to 
prohibit desegregated schools); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND 
CONGRESS, 1863–1869, at 113 (1990) hereinafter MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS] (“[T]here is no 
evidence that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to address the problem of 
segregation.”); Earl M. Maltz, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions—A Response to 
Professor McConnell, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 223 (1996) [hereinafter Maltz, Originalism] 
(arguing that Brown cannot be justified on originalist grounds). 
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question have disagreed.43  As did the Court in Brown, they have 
relied on the context in which the Fourteenth Amendment was 
drafted and ratified.   
First, because the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed in part 
to address doubts about Congress’s authority to enact the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, historians have focused on the meaning of that 
Act to shed light on the meaning of the Amendment.  An early 
draft of the statute included a provision prohibiting 
“discrimination in civil rights or immunities . . . on account of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude.”44  Many members of the 
House and Senate objected, expressing concern that this language 
might be construed to require integrated schools.45  Proponents of 
the civil rights provision responded by insisting that the provision 
would not prohibit segregation in public education.  For example, 
Representative James Wilson, who managed the bill in the House, 
declared that the civil rights provision did not “mean that all 
citizens shall sit on the juries, or that their children shall attend 
                                                                                                               
 42 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 360–61, 366 (1986); LAURENCE H. TRIBE & 
MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 12–13 (1991) (discussing Brown); 
Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to 
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1881–83 (1995) (arguing that Brown is not 
defensible on originalist grounds); Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in 
Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1919 (1991) (“For if Congress did not 
manifest an intent to outlaw segregation, where could the Court find its authority to hold 
segregation unconstitutional?” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Alexander M. 
Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1955) (“The history of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, to which reargument in 
these [segregation] cases had been largely addressed . . . was . . . inclusive at best.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 43 See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 258 n.26 (1992) (surveying the 
literature and concluding that “the ‘original understanding’ on the issue of school 
segregation is not genuinely in doubt”); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the 
Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 951 (1995) (“Virtually nothing in the 
congressional debates suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prohibit 
school segregation, while contemporaneous state practices render such an interpretation 
fanciful[l].”).  McConnell nevertheless argued that Brown is reconcilable with the original 
meaning, but most historians have disagreed with his account.  See infra notes 75–92 and 
accompanying text. 
 44 Ronald Turner, Was “Separate but Equal” Constitutional?: Borkian Originalism and 
Brown, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 229, 238–39, 239 n.61 (1995). 
 45 See Bickel, supra note 42, at 18–20 (quoting statements by members of Congress who 
objected to the Civil Rights bill). 
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the same schools.”46  Such assurances, however, did not satisfy the 
skeptics, and Representative John Bingham responded by 
supporting a motion to strike the civil rights provision from the 
bill.47  He explained that striking the provision would make the 
bill “less oppressive, and therefore less objectionable,” particularly 
in light of the fact that “[t]here is scarcely a State in this Union 
which does not, by its constitution or by its statute laws, make 
some discrimination on account of race or color between citizens of 
the United States in respect of civil rights.”48  There thus is ample 
evidence that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not prohibit 
segregated public schools—or at least that the Members of 
Congress who voted on the bill, both in support or in opposition, 
did not understand it to prohibit segregation. 
Second, historians have noted that congressional proponents of 
the Fourteenth Amendment argued that it was designed 
effectively to constitutionalize the provisions of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866.  Indeed, Bingham, who played a central role in 
eliminating the civil rights provision from the Act of 1866, drafted 
the Fourteenth Amendment and served as its primary sponsor in 
the House.49  As Alexander Bickel noted, the rights-granting 
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment “became the subject of 
a stock generalization: it was dismissed as embodying and, in one 
sense for the Republicans, in another for the Democrats and 
Conservatives, ‘constitutionalizing’ the Civil Rights Act.”50  
Because the Act had been amended in significant part for the 
purpose of clarifying that it would not require integrated schools, 
there is strong reason to conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment 
likewise would have been understood to permit segregation.51 
Third, at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, segregated schools were common, either as a matter 
                                                                                                               
 46 Id. at 16.  
 47 See id. at 22 (describing John Bingham’s efforts to revise the bill). 
 48 Id. at 22–23 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1271–72 (1865)). 
 49 See id. at 29–30, 42–43 (noting that Bingham drafted the privilege or immunities, due 
process, and equal protection language that appears in the Fourth Amendment). 
 50 Id. at 58. 
 51 See id. (“The obvious conclusion . . . is that section I of the fourteenth amendment, like 
section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 . . . as originally understood, was [not] meant to 
apply . . . to . . . segregation.”). 
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of practice or legal requirement, in many Northern and 
Midwestern states.52  As Earl Maltz has noted, Republican 
proponents of ratification repeatedly assured voters in these 
states, particularly the swing states closer to the border of the old 
Confederacy, that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment would 
have only a minimal impact on their states’ laws.53  (Indeed, this 
state of affairs helps to explain why even Republicans favored 
eliminating the civil rights provision from the Act of 1866.)  It is 
difficult to believe that the legislatures in these states would have 
ratified the Amendment if it prohibited such a common (and 
popular) practice.  As Michael Klarman has explained, the 
“political and social context in which the Fourteenth Amendment 
was drafted and ratified” makes it “inconceivable that most—
indeed even very many—Americans in 1866–68 would have 
endorsed a constitutional amendment to forbid public school 
segregation.”54  
Finally, most historians to have considered the question have 
noted that most Republicans in the 39th Congress—the same 
Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment—continued to 
support segregated schools in the District of Columbia.55  Before 
1862, there was no publicly supported schooling for black children 
in the District.56  In that year, Congress enacted laws “initiating a 
system of education of colored children,”57 financed by a special tax 
on property “owned by persons of color.”58  In 1864, Congress 
changed the funding mechanism for the schools for black children 
                                                                                                               
 52 See Klarman, supra note 42, at 1885–90 (demonstrating how little support for 
desegregation existed in the United States at that time); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive 
History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 252 (1991) (noting that “twenty-
four of the thirty-seven states then in the union either required or permitted racially 
segregated schools”).  
 53 Maltz, Originalism, supra note 41, at 228–29 (noting that in order to appeal to swing 
state voters, Republicans assured voters that Section 1 would only minimally impact 
Northern states). 
 54 Klarman, supra note 42, at 1884. 
 55 See, e.g., Maltz, Originalism, supra note 41, at 229 (“[C]ontemporaneously with the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the same Republicans continued to support the segregated school 
system in the District of Columbia.”).   
 56 McConnell, supra note 43, at 977. 
 57 Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 77, § 35, 12 Stat. 394, 402.  
 58 Act of May 21, 1862, ch. 83, § 1, 12 Stat. 407. 
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but apparently kept intact the structure of separate schools.59  In 
1866, the same year that Congress approved the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Congress appropriated money for the two separate 
school systems, without questioning whether the system of 
segregated schooling was problematic.60  In addition, in 1871 and 
1872, Congress debated bills that would have ended the practice of 
segregated schools in the District, but they all failed.61  (Anyone 
watching the Senate’s deliberation on these bills would have sat, 
as Raoul Berger has noted, in a segregated gallery.)62 
Of course, because the Fourteenth Amendment directly 
constrained only state, and not congressional, power, Congress’s 
apparent contemporaneous support for segregated schools in the 
District does not dispositively reveal Congress’s understanding of 
the “perceived dictates” of the Equal Protection Clause.63  But it 
nevertheless is powerful evidence that the same Members of 
Congress who passed the Fourteenth Amendment—and used it as 
a virtual campaign platform in 186664—did not view integrated 
schools as essential to the vision of civil rights that they sought to 
instantiate by passage of the Amendment.    
As a consequence, the conventional view has long been that 
Brown cannot be justified on originalist grounds.65  The Court 
itself did not seem to believe that the original understanding of 
how the Fourteenth Amendment would apply to the question of 
racially segregated schools was, or ought to be, dispositive.66  The 
                                                                                                               
 59 See McConnell, supra note 43, at 977–78 (noting that in 1864 Congress abolished the 
special tax while assuming that the schools would remain segregated). 
 60 See Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 296, 14 Stat. 310, 316 (appropriating funds for various 
civil expenses, including schools); Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 308, 14 Stat. 343 (granting land 
for colored schools within the district).  Congress did not seriously debate either bill. 
 61 See McConnell, supra note 43, at 978–80 (discussing the various failed efforts to 
desegregate the school systems).   
 62 See BERGER, supra note 12, at 125.   
 63 McConnell, supra note 43, at 980. 
 64 See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE 
TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 58 (1988) (discussing the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 65 See McConnell, supra note 43, at 952 (“In the fractured discipline of constitutional law, 
there is something very close to a consensus that Brown was inconsistent with the original 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, except perhaps at an extremely high and 
indeterminate level of abstraction.”). 
 66 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) (“In approaching this problem, 
we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted . . . .”).  
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Court declared that, in approaching the problem, “we cannot turn 
the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even 
to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.”67  And even 
scholars, such as Alexander Bickel, who strongly supported the 
outcome in Brown struggled to justify the decision’s rather obvious 
departure from the original understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.68  Indeed, an entire generation of constitutional law 
theorists came of age seeking to justify Brown—and the Court’s 
willingness to invalidate the policies at issue in the case—
notwithstanding the fact that the decision could not seek refuge in 
the original meaning of the Constitution.69  
Raoul Berger, one of the founding fathers of the modern 
originalist movement, agreed that the result in Brown was 
inconsistent with the original intent of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and as a consequence he argued that the Court’s 
decision—notwithstanding the moral and normative appeal of the 
outcome—was incorrect and illegitimate.70  Berger relied on much 
of the same evidence described above,71 and he concluded that “the 
framers had no intention of striking down segregation.”72  Berger’s 
approach was characteristic of the old originalism: it focused on 
the subjective intent of the framers (in this case, the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment), and it paid special attention to how the 
framers would have expected the text to apply to the particular 
                                                                                                               
 67 Id. at 492.  See also McConnell, supra note 43, at 949 (stating that the opinion in 
Brown was an “explicit, self-conscious departure from the traditional view that the Court 
may override democratic decisions only on the basis of the Constitution’s text, history, and 
interpretive tradition—not on considerations of modern social policy”). 
 68 See Bickel, supra note 42, at 4, 65 (noting the “embarrassment of going counter to . . . 
the original understanding”).  
 69 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. 
L. REV. 1537, 1537 (2004) (“Most law professors agree that any serious normative theory of 
constitutional interpretation must be consistent with Brown v. Board of Education and 
show why the case was correctly decided.” (internal footnotes omitted)); Herbert Wechsler, 
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26 (1959) (describing 
the desegregation decisions as posing “the hardest test of my belief in principled 
adjudication”).  See generally Colby & Smith, supra note 14 (discussing liberals’ attempts to 
justify Brown). 
 70 BERGER, supra note 12, at 117–33, 241–45. 
 71 Id. at 117–33 (detailing the history of the Civil Rights Act and its connection to the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
 72 Id. at 125. 
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question at issue.  For Berger, the question was not whether the 
result in Brown was desirable; it was, instead, whether the result 
was consistent with the original intent.73  Because it was not, 
Berger concluded, Brown was wrong.74   
But this view, though consistent with the form of original-intent 
originalism for which Berger advocated, was a tough sell.  By the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, when the modern originalist 
movement was gaining steam, Brown was deeply entrenched in 
our legal, political, and cultural norms.  Advancing an approach to 
constitutional interpretation that maintained that Brown was 
wrong was not a particularly effective recipe for attracting new 
adherents to the cause.  As Michael McConnell observed, “[s]uch is 
the moral authority of Brown that if any particular theory does not 
produce the conclusion that Brown was correctly decided, the 
theory is seriously discredited.”75  Indeed, “what once was seen as 
a weakness” in the decision—the fact that it cannot be squared 
with the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment—
had become “a mighty weapon against the proposition that the 
Constitution should be interpreted as it was understood by the 
people who framed and ratified it.”76 
McConnell, who Keith Whittington referred to as “undoubtedly 
the most prominent new originalist,”77 thus sought to construct an 
originalist argument in favor of Brown.78 He acknowledged there 
have been “remarkably few exceptions” to the historical consensus 
                                                                                                               
 73 See id. at 133 (noting that whether a law achieves a moral or public good is not the 
same as whether the law is constitutional). 
 74 See id. at 245 (“[Chief Justice Warren] did not merely ‘shape’ the law, he upended 
it . . . .”). 
 75 McConnell, supra note 43, at 952; accord Balkin, supra note 69, at 1537 (“[A]lmost 
every serious constitutional theory is already consistent with [Brown].”); J.M. Balkin & 
Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1018 (1998) 
(“Our notions of what is canonical tell us that we have to justify Brown . . . .”); Jamal 
Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 381 (2011) (“[A]ll legitimate constitutional 
decisions must be consistent with Brown’s rightness, and all credible theories of 
constitutional interpretational must accommodate the decision.”); BORK, supra note 12, at 
77 (“It is not surprising that academic lawyers were unwilling to give [Brown] up, it had to 
be right.  Thus, Brown has become the high ground of constitutional theory.”). 
 76 McConnell, supra note 43, at 952–53. 
 77 Whittington, supra note 10, at 608. 
 78 See generally McConnell, supra note 43 (developing an originalist argument in favor of 
Brown). 
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that Brown was inconsistent with the original meaning.79  But he 
attempted to defend Brown on originalist grounds by relying not 
on the evidence described above from 1866–1868, but instead on 
the views expressed during legislative debates on Senator Charles 
Sumner’s proposed Civil Rights Bill in the mid-1870s.80  
McConnell put dispositive weight on the fact that during those 
debates—which ultimately produced a law that banned racial 
discrimination in inns, theaters, common carriers, and other forms 
of public accommodation, but not in public schools—between one-
half and two-thirds of both houses of Congress voted, at one point 
or another, in favor of school desegregation.81  
McConnell acknowledged that evidence from the debates over 
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 “might be inferior in principle to 
information directly bearing on the opinions and expectations of 
the framers and ratifiers during deliberations over the 
Amendment itself,” but in his view there was substantially less 
evidence “concerning the latter.”82  His interpretive methodology 
thus was similar to Berger’s: he sought to ascertain “the original 
understanding of the meaning of the [Fourteenth] Amendment as 
it bears on the issue of school segregation”83 and “the specific 
intentions and understandings of the framing generation 
regarding the issue of public school segregation.”84  But in light of 
the ultimate failure of the legislative effort in the 1870s to ban 
segregation in schools—obviously a problem for the argument that 
the debates over the bill establish that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was widely understood to prohibit segregated 
schools85—McConnell proposed a second “perspective” on the 
                                                                                                               
 79 Id. at 950. 
 80 See id. at 984–85.  
 81 See id. at 953, 985 (describing the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and noting the large number 
of votes in which members of Congress voiced opposition to segregated schools). 
 82 Id. at 984. 
 83 Id.  
 84 Id. at 1093. 
 85 McConnell’s argument operated on a more subtle level, as well.  He argued that even 
though the bills failed, they indicated that many members of Congress understood 
themselves to have power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to address these 
matters, a power they could enjoy only if Section 1 of the Amendment reached segregation 
in public schools.  Id. at 990–91.  But this argument suffers from at least two problems.  
First, it is not clear that the members of the Reconstruction Congress had as narrow a view 
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question of original meaning: an inquiry that considered the 
“understanding” of the participants in the debates in the 1870s “of 
the relevant constitutional issues—the permissibility of 
segregation and the status of education as a civil right.”86 
McConnell then adjusted the level of generality at which he 
conducted this second inquiry.  In a sign of the evolution of 
originalist theory, McConnell declared that “[i]t is widely agreed 
among originalists that the intentions or understandings of the 
framers regarding a specific issue, while informative, are not 
ultimately authoritative, for it is their understanding of the 
constitutional principles embodied in the constitutional 
provision—not their analysis of a particular legal phenomenon—
that is controlling.”87  Accordingly, he also sought to determine the 
views of the participants in the congressional debates in the 1870s 
on whether “separation by race [is] inconsistent with the 
requirement of equality,” and whether “the equality requirement 
of the Fourteenth Amendment [applies] to public education.”88  
Although “the collective judgment of the Congress in 1875 seemed 
to be ‘yes’ to the first question and ‘no’ to the second,”89  McConnell 
suggested that by the mid-twentieth century, education’s status as 
a civil right was sufficiently well settled to bring education within 
the reach of the principle that the Amendment’s framers had 
enacted.90  
Even this inquiry was addressed to determining the views of 
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment on the particular 
question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited 
racially segregated schools.  Although McConnell concluded that 
the result in Brown was consistent with the Amendment’s original 
understanding, he was swimming strongly against the historical 
                                                                                                               
of the Section 5 power as modern doctrine suggests.  See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 527–28 (1997) (rejecting the view that Congress has power under Section 5 to 
“enact legislation that expands the rights contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment”).  
Second, the fact that the legislative efforts in the 1870s to prohibit racial segregation in 
schools failed undermines the claim that there was a broad consensus in favor of the view 
that Section 1 prohibited such segregation. 
 86 McConnell, supra note 43, at 1093. 
 87 Id. at 1101. 
 88 Id.  
 89 Id.  
 90 See id. at 1103–04 (explaining that by 1954, public education had become a civil right). 
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tide, and in particular the powerful evidence, described above, that 
most of the participants in the actual debate over the adoption and 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment—and, perhaps more 
important, most of the people of the time—appeared to have 
understood the Amendment to permit racially segregated 
schools.91   Indeed, the weight of opinion about McConnell’s article 
is that it was an impressive and sincere effort that nevertheless 
fell short of demonstrating that the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited racial segregation in public 
schools.92    
Justifying Brown on originalist grounds thus would take more 
than a careful historical effort to uncover the specific views of the 
framers of the Amendment.  As McConnell seemed to understand, 
to justify Brown we must consider the original meaning at a 
higher level of generality.  Consider the views of Robert Bork, one 
of the founding fathers of the modern originalist movement.  Bork 
did not ignore the historical evidence described above of views 
about segregation’s status under the Fourteenth Amendment; to 
the contrary, he acknowledged that “[t]he inescapable fact is that 
those who ratified the amendment did not think it outlawed 
segregated education or segregation in any aspect of life.”93  Bork 
thus accepted that the framers of the Amendment “assumed that 
equality and state-compelled separation of the races were 
consistent.”94   
But Bork nevertheless contended that the result in Brown was 
consistent with the “original understanding of the equal protection 
clause.”95  In his view, although “[t]he ratifiers probably assumed 
that segregation was consistent with equality,” they “were not 
                                                                                                               
 91 See Klarman, supra note 42, at 1891 (explaining that integrated schools were the 
exception, not the rule, in the early postbellum period). 
 92 See, e.g., id. at 1882–83 (praising McConnell’s contributions but critiquing his 
orginalist defense of Brown); Maltz, Originalism, supra note 41, at 223 (“[McConnell] adds 
greatly to our understanding of the doctrinal arguments that surrounded the desegregation 
issue in the 1870s, [but] . . . . fails in his attempt to demonstrate that the decision in Brown 
is consistent with the original understanding.”) ; Jordan Steiker, American Icon: Does it 
Matter What the Court Said in Brown?, 81 TEX. L. REV. 305, 322 (2002) (book review) (“In 
the end, McConnell’s opinion is unpersuasive . . . .”). 
 93 BORK, supra note 12, at 75–76. 
 94 Id. at 81. 
 95 Id.  
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addressing segregation,” because the “text itself demonstrates that 
the equality under law was the primary goal.”96  By 1954, however, 
“it had been apparent for some time that segregation rarely if ever 
produced equality.”97  Bork thus concluded that the result (though 
not the reasoning) in Brown was correct as an originalist matter, 
because the “purpose that brought the fourteenth amendment into 
being” was “equality,” and “equality and segregation were 
mutually inconsistent,” even “though the ratifiers did not 
understand that.”98   
In other words, Bork argued that although the Fourteenth 
Amendment originally was understood to permit segregated 
schools, Brown nevertheless reached the correct result because we 
should seek the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment at 
a higher level of generality.  On this view, the relevant inquiry is 
not to determine what the framers or ratifiers of the constitutional 
text thought about what it meant or how it would apply, but 
instead to seek the objective original meaning of the text by 
discerning the broad animating principle behind the text and then 
to apply it to concrete (and modern) circumstances.99  
                                                                                                               
 96 Id. at 82. 
 97 Id.  
 98 Id.; accord Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 
47 IND. L.J. 1, 14 (1971) (“[The Fourteenth Amendment] was intended to enforce a core idea 
of black equality against governmental discrimination.”).   
 99 Steven Calabresi (with Michael Perl) has advanced a more carefully researched version 
of this form of originalist argument in defense of Brown.  See generally Steven G. Calabresi 
& Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education, 3 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429 
(2014) (providing originalist defense for Brown); see also Steven G. Calabresi, Does the 
Fourteenth Amendment Guarantee Equal Justice For All?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 
150–51 (2010) [hereinafter Calabresi, Equal Justice] (same).  Rather than arguing simply 
that the Fourteenth Amendment requires “equality,” as did Bork, Calabresi asserts that the 
Fourteenth Amendment “bans all forms of caste-like discrimination,” including the “racial 
caste system” that the Court invalidated in Brown.  Id. at 149–50; see also John Harrison, 
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1388–89 (1992) 
(“Thus, an amendment that forbade the states from abridging privileges or immunities 
would ban caste legislation . . . .”).  Because “[a]t the time the Fourteenth Amendment was 
enacted, thirty-six of the thirty-seven states required in their state constitutions that public 
schools be provided,” Calabresi concludes that the “right to a public school education was, 
for all practical purposes, a privilege or immunity of state citizenship.”  Calabresi, Equal 
Justice, supra, at 150.  Segregation in schools, Calabresi argues, impermissibly abridged 
that right for African Americans, rendering policies of segregation impermissible forms of 
caste-like discrimination.  As Bork had argued, Calabresi asserted that “[t]he fact that such 
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I will return shortly to Bork’s approach to Brown, and what it 
suggests both about his approach to originalism and the dilemma 
of the level of generality more broadly.  For now, it is sufficient to 
note that, whatever one thinks of Bork’s approach,100 it opened the 
floodgates for originalist claims (albeit usually stated conclusorily) 
that the result in Brown is defensible on originalist grounds.  
Indeed, it is virtually impossible today to find an originalist who 
even entertains the possibility that the result in Brown was 
inconsistent with the original meaning.101   
III.  BEYOND BROWN 
Consider two immediate implications of Bork’s approach to 
Brown.  First, it helps to immunize originalism from claims that it 
                                                                                                               
segregation had been practiced in 1868 and had been around for a very long time did not 
change the fact that it was and always had been unconstitutional.”  Id. at 151. 
 100 For critiques of Bork’s position, see Brest, supra note 35, at 1091–92 (“The fact is that 
all adjudication requires making choices among the levels of generality . . . and all such 
choices are inherently non-neutral.  No form of constitutional decision-making can be 
salvaged if its legitimacy depends on satisfying Bork’s requirements that principles be 
neutrally derived, defined, and applied.” (internal quotations omitted)); Richard A. Posner, 
Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1375–76 (1990) (calling Bork’s position 
unconvincing and inconsistent); Raoul Berger, Robert Bork’s Contribution To Original 
Intention, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1167, 1176–83 (1990) (book review) (criticizing Bork’s view of 
Brown); David A.J. Richards, Originalism Without Foundations, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373, 
1379–82 (1990) (book review) (asserting that Bork’s originalist defense of Brown is 
ineffective). 
 101 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 773-780 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[M]y view was the rallying cry for the 
lawyers who litigated Brown.”); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 88 (2012) (asserting that the text of the Equal Protection 
Clause “can reasonably be thought to prohibit all laws designed to assert the separateness 
and superiority of the white race, even those that purport to treat the races equally”); 
Calabresi, Equal Justice, supra note 99, at 151 (“The fact that such segregation had been 
practiced in 1868 and had been around for a very long time did not change the fact that it 
was and always had been unconstitutional.  For this reason, the Supreme Court was on 
solid originalist ground when it struck down segregation in public schools.”); John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 
1693, 1763 (2010) (“We believe that Brown’s holding extending the equality guarantee 
beyond private contract to public schooling can be defended on originalist grounds. . . .”); 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis Require 
Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 
1194 (2008) (“Brown is a marvelous decision, a wonderful restoration of a lost original 
understanding of the meaning of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and a repudiation 
of a socially invented limitation on that meaning by the Jim Crow era.”). 
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cannot account for some of the most widely accepted, and 
normatively desirable, judicially created doctrines of constitutional 
law from the twentieth century: the Court’s invalidation of bans on 
interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia102 and the Court’s 
application of heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate on the 
basis of sex.103  Failure to accommodate these decisions, like a 
failure to justify Brown, would be not only a significant 
embarrassment for originalism, but also likely fatal for the claim 
that originalism is the only legitimate means of assigning 
constitutional meaning.  Second, it creates the possibility of an 
originalist justification for constitutional prohibitions on 
previously unrecognized bases for discrimination—such as sexual 
orientation—and constitutional protection for rights that have 
conventionally been thought to be untethered to the original 
meaning of the Constitution.  
A.  EQUAL PROTECTION 
Consider how Bork’s approach would apply to prohibitions on 
interracial marriage.  In Loving, the Court invalidated Virginia’s 
ban on most interracial marriages.104  As with Brown, the 
conventional view is that Loving cannot be reconciled with the 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.105  Indeed, 
Virginia’s brief in the Supreme Court relied heavily on the original 
                                                                                                               
 102 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 103 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[C]lassifications by gender must 
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement 
of those objectives.”).  
 104 388 U.S. at 11–12. 
 105 See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 228 (2011) (“If we follow . . . original-
meaning originalism. . . . Loving v. Virginia is wrong . . . .”); RANDALL KENNEDY, 
INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 252 (2003) (“The 
historical record strongly indicates that the politicians who framed the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not intend for it to render illegal statutes prohibiting interracial 
marriage.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 247 (1995) (arguing that Loving cannot 
be justified on originalist grounds); Cass Sunstein, Debate on Radicals in Robes, in 
ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER CENTURY OF DEBATE 293 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007) 
(contending that an originalist view of the Constitution cannot justify the invalidation of 
bans on interracial marriage); Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 996 (1998) (criticizing John Harrison’s originalist defense of 
Loving); Klarman, Response, supra note 42, at 1919–20 (noting that even if one accepts 
McConnell’s originalist defense of Brown, it would not justify the result in Loving). 
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understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.106  Although the 
Court in Loving reiterated its claim from Brown that evidence of 
the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment with 
respect to the question of interracial marriage bans was “at 
best . . . inconclusive,”107 the evidence is in fact quite strong that 
the framers did not understand the Amendment to prohibit bans 
on interracial marriage.  Laws banning interracial marriage were 
commonplace at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  In addition, when opponents of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the civil rights bills in 
the 1870s regularly (and perhaps demagogically) opposed those 
provisions in part on the ground that they would invalidate state 
bans on interracial marriage, Republican supporters repeatedly 
stressed that they would not disturb those bans.108  Presumably for 
this reason, the Supreme Court itself has suggested that the 
decision in Loving was not rooted in the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.109  
Accordingly, early accounts of Loving concluded that it was 
indefensible on originalist grounds.  The year before the Court 
decided Loving, Alfred Avins contended, after a survey of the 
debates over the Fourteenth Amendment and related legislation, 
                                                                                                               
 106 See Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellee, in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND 
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 794, 798 (Philip B. Kurland & 
Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). 
 107 388 U.S. at 9 (quoting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954)).  
 108 See Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amendment: The 
Original Intent, 52 VA. L. REV. 1224, 1253 (1966) (“No Republican member of Congress 
advocated miscegenation, [yet] . . . . [t]he Democrats injected the cry of amalgamation into 
every conceivable debate, no matter how irrelevant it actually was.”). 
 109 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (stating that “neither history nor 
tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack” (quoting 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847–48 (1992) (resisting the 
“tempting” view that the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted consistent with its 
original understanding, because “[m]arriage is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and 
interracial marriage was illegal in most States in the 19th century, but the Court was no 
doubt correct in finding it to be an aspect of liberty protected against state interference by 
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause”).  David Upham has contested the 
view that interracial marriage was, in practice, illegal in most states after the ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that bans often were not enforced.  See David R. 
Upham, Interracial Marriage and the Original Understanding of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 259–80 (2015). 
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that no one in the Congress that drafted and adopted the 
Fourteenth Amendment “seriously thought” that state laws 
banning interracial marriage “were within the pale of the 
amendment’s prohibitions.”110  Similarly, Raoul Berger, after 
reviewing the congressional debates over the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, asserted that “[f]ew of the most ardent 
abolitionists would have dared argue for intermarriage at this 
time, because it would have wrecked their hope of securing the 
indispensable ‘fundamental rights’ to blacks.”111  He acknowledged 
that the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which the Fourteenth 
Amendment effectively constitutionalized, protected the right of 
African Americans to make and enforce contracts; but in light of 
the statements by the framers about interracial marriage, “[t]o 
attribute to the framers an intention by the word ‘contract’ to 
authorize intermarriage runs counter to all intendments.”112  
Accordingly, he concluded that the framers “did not mean to 
prevent exclusion from . . . miscegenation laws.”113  Unlike the case 
of segregated schools, moreover, there is no evidence, even in the 
decade that followed the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
that a majority (let alone a super-majority) of members of 
Congress believed that the Amendment prohibited state laws 
banning interracial marriage.114   
                                                                                                               
 110 Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws, supra note 108, at 1253.  Avins’s account was self-
consciously originalist in nature, even if that term had not yet been coined to describe his 
approach.  See id. at 1225 (“I believe that once the original understanding and intent of the 
framers is ascertained, the inquiry should be at an end.”).  
 111 BERGER, supra note 12, at 161. 
 112 Id. at 161–62. 
 113 Id. at 241. 
 114 Presumably for this reason, Michael McConnell, in the course of endeavoring to 
demonstrate that the result in Brown was consistent with the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, did not offer a similarly robust defense of Loving.  To be sure, 
McConnell asserted that “it is striking that not a single supporter of the 1875 Act attempted 
to deny that under their interpretation, anti-miscegenation laws were unconstitutional.”  
McConnell, Desegregation Decisions, supra note 43, at 1018.  But he also concluded that the 
“effect of the Fourteenth Amendment was not to alter the boundary between civil and social 
rights, but to make race an unreasonable basis for discrimination within the civil sphere.”  
Id. at 1022–23.  As Michael Klarman has noted, because “McConnell accepts the 
conventional view that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment distinguished civil from 
political and social rights, and barred racial discrimination only with regard to the former,” 
and because “interracial marriage” was plainly a “social” right, McConnell’s approach 
cannot justify Loving.  Klarman, supra note 42, at 1919–20.  But see Upham, supra note 
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But what if we seek the Amendment’s original meaning at a 
higher level of generality?  According to Steven Calabresi and 
Andrea Matthews, when one asks the correct question, it becomes 
“very easy” to see why Loving is correct as an originalist matter.115  
Calabresi and Matthews do not dispute the traditional view that 
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not understand the 
Amendment to invalidate bans on interracial marriage.116  But 
they contend that the original-intent originalism exemplified by 
Raoul Berger’s work was “wrong,” and that the original public 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment trumps the framers’ 
subjective understandings and expectations about how it would 
apply.117  On their account, which they support principally by 
citing to a series of nineteenth century dictionaries, the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause 
protected “positive law entitlements” in state common, statutory, 
and constitutional law “conferring civil rights on state citizens”; 
the rights that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 protected, including 
the right “to make and enforce contracts”; and other “fundamental 
rights.”118  They then reason that in 1868, the right to marry—
which, at bottom, is just a contractual relationship—clearly was 
both a privilege and immunity of state citizenship, a privilege or 
immunity of national citizenship, and a fundamental right.119  
Accordingly, they argue, laws banning racial intermarriage 
“obviously” “abridge or shorten or lessen the literal right of African 
Americans and white Americans ‘to make and enforce 
contracts.’ ”120  They assert, in an echo of Bork’s argument about 
                                                                                                               
109, at 259–80 (arguing that after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Republican 
judges and officials routinely declined to enforce bans on interracial marriage, based upon a 
belief that such bans violated the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 115 Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 2012 
BYU L. REV. 1393, 1398. 
 116 See id. (describing as a “fact” the assertion that “the Reconstruction Framers expected 
their laws to be consistent with . . . bans on racial intermarriage”). 
 117 Id. at 1475. 
 118 Id. at 1413–20. 
 119 See id. at 1419–20 (describing the right to marry as both a privilege or immunity of 
state citizenship and a fundamental right).  
 120 Id. at 1422 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Calabresi, Equal Justice, supra 
note 99, at 151 (arguing that Loving was correctly decided “because the Fourteenth 
Amendment had constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which said that African 
Americans had the ‘same’ right to make contracts as was enjoyed by a while citizen”); 
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Brown, that after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, a 
state “clearly” could not constitutionally restrict the right to marry 
with racially discriminatory laws, “even though almost no-one 
realized it at the time.”121 
To be sure, there is nothing particularly novel—even in 
originalist circles these days—about Calabresi and Matthews’s 
suggestion that we should ignore the framers’ original intent, 
subjective understandings, or expectations about how the 
constitutional text would apply.  For years now, most originalists 
have moved, at least as a formal matter, towards the conclusion 
that the appropriate object in constitutional interpretation is the 
original objective meaning of the text, not the framers’ subjective 
intent, understanding, or expectations.122  Their approach to the 
question of interracial marriage—like Bork’s approach to the 
validity of racial segregation under the Equal Protection Clause—
is simply a move in that direction. 
But this approach, in conjunction with an inquiry that seeks the 
original meaning at a higher level of generality, can unsettle 
conventional understandings of the Constitution’s original 
meaning in other contexts, as well.  Consider the question of the 
constitutional status of official discrimination on the basis of sex.  
At the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
states routinely excluded women from the benefits of equal 
citizenship.  The text of the Amendment itself, in Section 2,123 by 
                                                                                                               
Harrison, supra note 99, at 1459–60 (stating that both the Civil Rights Act and the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited bans on interracial marriage). 
 121 Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 115, at 1419–20; see also id. at 1421 (“Obviously, 
many of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that the government had a 
compelling interest in preventing interracial marriage, but it is just as obvious that it was a 
ban on racial intermarriage which lay at the bottom of the very racial caste system that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was written to extirpate.”); Calabresi, Equal Justice, supra note 99, 
at 151–52 (“[T]he fact the Framers of the Amendment did not understand [that the 
Fourteenth Amendment gave African Americans the right to marry white citizens] means 
nothing.  Members of Congress rarely read much less understand the laws they make, but 
that does not make those laws any less binding on all of us.”). 
 122 See Colby & Smith, supra note 24, at 250–55 (describing the shift from original intent 
to original objective meaning); Colby, supra note 18, at 720–30 (discussing how new 
originalists reject a search for subjective intent and instead seek objective meaning). 
 123 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (“[W]hen the right to vote at any election . . . is denied to 
any of the male inhabitants of [a] State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the 
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, 
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implication tolerates the denial to women of the right to vote.124  
Indeed, during the debate over the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and 
other women’s rights advocates publicly campaigned to remove 
gender as a measure of suffrage.125  They also petitioned Congress 
for a constitutional amendment to “prohibit the several States 
from disfranchising any of their citizens on the ground of sex.”126  
Representative Thaddeus Stevens introduced the petition into the 
Congressional Record, and two years later other Senators proposed 
language that would have incorporated a universal suffrage 
provision into the Fifteenth Amendment, but the efforts failed.127   
Women’s rights advocates then began a campaign to convince 
the courts that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and in 
particular the Privileges or Immunities Clause, protected women 
against discrimination in the grant of the franchise and in the 
exercise of other rights.128  Just a few years after the ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, however, the Court made clear its 
view that the exclusion of women from the practice of law did not 
offend the Amendment.129  Several years later, in the course of 
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit the exclusion 
of African Americans from service on juries, the Court reasoned 
that the state “may confine the selection to males,” because it did 
                                                                                                               
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of 
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age 
in such State.”). 
 124 See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 13 (2010) (“Section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . actually enshrines sex discrimination, by assuming that the 
electorate will consist only of men.”); Michael C. Dorf, Tainted Law, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 923, 
933 (2012) (“At the very least, the inclusion of the word ‘male’ in Section 2 tells us that the 
framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend or expect it to extend the 
franchise to women.”). 
 125 See Ellen Carol Dubois, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman 
Suffrage, and the United States Constitution, 1820–1878, 74 J. AM. HIS. 836, 847 (1987). 
 126 Petition for Universal Suffrage, THE ELIZABETH CADY STANTON & SUSAN B. ANTHONY 
PAPERS PROJECT, http://ecssba.rutgers.edu/docs/rutuniv.html (last updated Aug. 2010). 
 127 See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 969–70 & n.59 (2002) (describing 
proposals by Senators Pomeroy and Fowler). 
 128 Id. at 972.  
 129 See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (“[T]he civil 
law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective 
spheres and destinies of man and woman.”). 
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“not believe the Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to 
prohibit [that].”130   
Indeed, women did not gain the right to vote until the adoption 
of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1919,131 and the Court did not 
conclude that discrimination by the government on the basis of sex 
triggered meaningful concerns under the Equal Protection Clause 
until the early 1970s, when the drive to adopt the Equal Rights 
Amendment—to correct the Constitution’s failure to protect 
women against discrimination—was in full steam.132  When the 
Court finally concluded, in 1976, that classifications on the basis of 
gender triggered heightened scrutiny, it did not even purport to 
suggest that this approach was required by the original meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating instead (rather dubiously) 
only that “previous cases” established the proper test.133 
As a consequence, at least until recently, the widely accepted 
view has been that the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not prohibit the states from classifying on the 
basis of sex.  For example, shortly after the Supreme Court held 
that official sex discrimination triggers heightened scrutiny, future 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that “[b]oldly dynamic 
interpretation, departing radically from the original 
understanding, is required to tie to the fourteenth amendment’s 
equal protection clause a command that government treat men 
and women as individuals equal in rights, responsibilities, and 
opportunities.”134   
This view was not confined to those who are skeptical of 
originalism as a means for ascertaining constitutional meaning.  
Lino Graglia, who was a prominent academic defender of 
originalism in the 1980s and 1990s, summarized the conventional 
                                                                                                               
 130 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879). 
 131 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”). 
 132 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (“To give a mandatory preference to members 
of either sex over members of the other . . . is to make the very kind of arbitrary, legislative 
choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ”); 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion) (stating that 
classifications based on sex are “inherently suspect”). 
 133 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 134 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights 
Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 161. 
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view about the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 
when he declared that  
there is no real doubt that the purpose of the equal 
protection clause was to prohibit certain 
discriminations by states on the basis of race.  This 
provision, given our history, is an important 
protection, but one that has absolutely nothing to do 
with the power of the states to make distinctions on 
many other grounds, such as on the basis of sex . . . .135 
As a consequence, Graglia argued, “Supreme Court decisions 
denying popularly elected state representatives the authority to 
make such distinctions are not legitimate constitutional 
decisions.”136  Similarly, Robert Bork, who proposed reading the 
Equal Protection Clause at a high level of generality to justify the 
Court’s decision in Brown, criticized the Court’s cases applying 
heightened scrutiny to laws classifying on the basis of sex, 
principally on the ground that the “ratifiers of the fourteenth 
amendment did not intend to treat women as a special class 
deserving protection as they did intend with respect to blacks.”137  
He concluded that “the equal protection clause should be restricted 
to race and ethnicity because to go further would plunge the courts 
into making law without guidance from anything the ratifiers 
understood themselves to be doing.”138    
This view, moreover, is not confined to old originalists writing 
in the 1970s and 1980s.  In 2011, Calvin Massey interviewed 
Justice Scalia for a magazine article.  Massey noted that “[i]n 
                                                                                                               
 135 Lino A. Graglia, “Constitutional Theory”: The Attempted Justification for the Supreme 
Court’s Liberal Political Program, 65 TEX. L. REV. 789, 795 (1987). 
 136 Id.; see also Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Law: A Ruse for Government by an 
Intellectual Elite, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 767, 776 (1998) (“In short, all talk of the Supreme 
Court ‘interpreting’ the Constitution in reaching its controversial rulings of 
unconstitutionality is purely conventional and entirely misleading.”). 
 137 BORK, supra note 12, at 326.  Bork also reasoned that, because “our society feels very 
strongly that relevant differences exist [between men and women] and should be respected 
by government,” a “court that applies the fourteenth amendment to women as a special 
group, rather than as part of the human race, must make cultural and political choices that 
it need not make when applying the amendment to racial groups.” Id. at 329. 
 138 Id. at 330. 
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1868, when the 39th Congress was debating and ultimately 
proposing the [Fourteenth] Amendment, I don’t think anybody 
would have thought that equal protection applied to sex 
discrimination.” He then asked Justice Scalia whether the Court 
had “gone off in error by applying the [Fourteenth] Amendment” to 
it.139  Justice Scalia responded:  
Certainly the Constitution does not require 
discrimination on the basis of sex.  The only issue is 
whether it prohibits it.  It doesn’t.  Nobody ever 
thought that that’s what it meant.  Nobody ever voted 
for that.  If the current society wants to outlaw 
discrimination by sex, hey we have things called 
legislatures, and they enact things called laws.  You 
don’t need a constitution to keep things up-to-date.  All 
you need is a legislature and a ballot box.140 
It appears, moreover, that reformulating the question as 
McConnell did for the question of segregated schools would not 
change this result.  Ward Farnsworth examined not only the 
debates from 1866 to 1868 on the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Congress, but also “congressional debates between 
1871 and 1875 over bills to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment,” 
to determine “what the Reconstruction Congresses understood 
themselves to have accomplished.”141  He acknowledged that much 
of the congressional debate about the effect of the Amendment on 
                                                                                                               
 139 The Originalist: Interview with Justice Antonin Scalia, CAL. LAWYER (Jan. 2011), 
http:// www.calllawyer.com/clstory.cfm?pubdt=Nan&eid=913358&evid=1.  
 140 Id.; see also Legally Speaking: Antonin Scalia, UCTV (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.uctv. 
tv/search-details.aspx?showID=20773 (recording of University of California Television 
broadcast).  Justice Scalia also declared, in an interview at Hastings Law School, that the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not ban sex discrimination because “[n]obody thought it was 
directed against sex discrimination.”  Adam Cohen, Justice Scalia Mouths Off on Sex 
Discrimination, TIME (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,202 
0667,00.html; cf. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that courts should apply rational-basis review to sex-based classifications 
because “[i]t is hard to consider women a ‘discrete and insular minorit[y]’ ” (alteration in 
original)). 
 141 Ward Farnsworth, Women Under Reconstruction: The Congressional Understanding, 
94 NW. U. L. REV. 1229, 1231 (2000).  
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women was “indirect,” in that it took place in the course of more 
heated debates about the Amendment’s effect on matters of race.142  
But in so doing, the “congressmen frequently appear to [have 
drawn] on widely shared beliefs about women and the regime of 
laws affecting them,” often “appeal[ing] to settled understandings 
about the legal position of women to challenge their adversaries in 
arguments about other issues, usually involving race, that [were] 
more controversial.”143  Even as they disagreed over the 
Amendment’s application to matters of race, therefore, there was 
“evidence of much common ground among them regarding the 
Amendment’s implications for women.”144  In light of this evidence, 
Farnsworth concluded that “[t]he Amendment was understood not 
to disturb the prevailing regime of state laws imposing very 
substantial legal disabilities on women, particularly married 
women.”145  Accordingly, the “type of originalism that Professor 
McConnell uses to show that Brown was correctly 
decided . . . leads to the conclusion that nineteenth-century laws 
imposing serious legal disabilities on women were 
constitutional.”146    
To reach the conclusion that the original meaning of the 
Constitution presumptively prohibits the states from 
discriminating on the basis of sex, in other words, requires a 
significantly more creative approach, and at a minimum one that 
does not rely simply on the subjective intentions and expectations 
of the framers of the constitutional text.147  Such an approach is 
also crucial for the viability of originalism, as it has become 
untenable to maintain that the Constitution tolerates official 
discrimination on the basis of sex, just as no respectable theory of 
constitutional interpretation today can lead to the conclusion that 
Brown was wrong.148     
                                                                                                               
 142 Id. at 1230.  
 143 Id. at 1233.  
 144 Id.  
 145 Id. at 1230.  
 146 Id.  
 147 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 124, at 934 (contending that if the expectations of the 
framers control, modern sex discrimination jurisprudence is indefensible). 
 148 See id. at 935 (“[I]t would simply be unthinkable that in 2012 the Equal Protection 
Clause could be interpreted to permit most forms of official sex discrimination.”). 
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And, in fact, Steven Calabresi has recently contended that 
originalism requires the conclusion that the Constitution forbids 
discrimination on the basis of gender.149  The argument requires 
us both to consider the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment at a higher level of generality than is used in the 
conventional account, described above, and to understand the 
Amendment through the lens of the Nineteenth Amendment, 
which was adopted a half-century later.150  First, Calabresi 
reasoned that the broad principle animating the Fourteenth 
Amendment is a ban on “all forms of caste-like discrimination.”151 
Second, he noted that “the Constitution explicitly addresses the 
subject of sex discrimination in the Nineteenth Amendment,” 
which “gave women the right to vote.”152  That right, in turn, “is a 
political right, unlike the civil rights addressed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”153  Third, Calabresi observed that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment “distinguished between civil rights, which 
were possessed by all citizens, including women and children, and 
political rights, which were exercised only by the male subset of 
                                                                                                               
 149 See Calabresi, Equal Justice, supra note 99, at 152 (arguing that the Nineteenth 
Amendment requires the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment bans sex 
discrimination with respect to civil rights).  
 150 Reva Siegel has similarly argued that we should understand the Constitution’s 
treatment of sex discrimination in light of the interaction between the Fourteenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments.  See Siegel, supra note 127, at 1039–44 (advocating for an 
interpretation of sex discrimination doctrine grounded in a reading of the Fourteenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments as well as the history of the Women’s Suffrage Movement).  Her 
approach, however, consciously eschewed the form of originalism on which Calabresi relies.  
See id. at 1032 (“[T]he actions of past generations of Americans who made or lived under 
the Constitution do not bind us in any simple sense.”).  Siegel argued the Nineteenth 
Amendment, which was the “product of a wide-ranging, multigenerational debate over the 
terms of women’s citizenship in a democratic constitutional order,” is effectively “part of the 
post-ratification history of the Fourteenth Amendment,” id. at 1034, and that “an additional 
foundation for sex discrimination doctrine” can emerge from “a synthetic reading of the 
Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments that is grounded in the history of the woman 
suffrage campaign,” id. at 949.   
 151 Calabresi, Equal Justice, supra note 99, at 149; see also Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. 
Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 17 (2011) (“Section 
One . . . enact[ed] a rule against class legislation and systems of caste.”); Harrison, supra 
note 99, at 1413 (noting that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away 
with “caste” legislation). 
 152 Calabresi, Equal Justice, supra note 99, at 152.  
 153 Id. 
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the population.”154  Fifth, he reasoned that, “[o]nce the 
Constitution had been amended to bar sex discrimination as to 
political rights it became utterly implausible that the no-caste 
command of the Fourteenth Amendment did not also ban most, if 
not all, sex discrimination as to civil rights” because “[p]olitical 
rights are rarer and more jealously guarded then civil rights.”155   
To reach these conclusions, Calabresi had to make a move 
similar to the one that Bork had made years earlier about 
Brown.156  In an article developing the argument in greater detail, 
Calabresi and Julia Rickert conceded that the “Framers and 
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment” did not “understand sex 
discrimination to be a form of caste or of special-interest class 
legislation,” but argued that “the Framers’ original expected 
applications of the constitutional text . . . are not the last word on 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s reach.”157  The framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, they explained, were “mistaken in their 
belief that laws discriminating on the basis of sex are not 
relevantly similar to laws that discriminate on the basis of race.”158  
Those framers “conceded that if women had been fitted by nature 
for the privileges and responsibilities afforded to men, then the 
fears of some and the hopes of others that the Fourteenth 
Amendment would threaten the sexual social order would be well 
founded.”159  But “[w]e now know more about women’s capabilities 
than the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers knew.”160  And 
because, “as Robert Bork has explained, we are governed by the 
constitutional law that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
wrote and not by the unenacted opinions that its members held,” it 
“follows that we also are not bound by their unenacted factual 
beliefs about the capabilities of women.”161  Moreover, they argue, 
unlike the evolving understandings about the harms of 
                                                                                                               
 154 Id. 
 155 Id.  
 156 See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
 157 Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 151, at 7. 
 158 Id. at 9.  
 159 Id.  
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
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segregation, the “change in our understanding of women’s abilities 
has been constitutionalized” by a subsequent amendment.162   
On Calabresi’s and Rickert’s account, the “definition of caste”—
a term that does not appear in the Fourteenth Amendment—“had 
not changed; rather, the capabilities of women and the truth of 
their status in society had come to be better understood and that 
new understanding was memorialized in the text of the 
Constitution.”163  Accordingly, even though the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment “inject[ed] their assumptions about 
women’s competence and proper sphere into the text of [Section 2 
of] the Fourteenth Amendment,” making it “very difficult to read 
the original 1868 version of the Fourteenth Amendment as a bar to 
sex discrimination,” the Nineteenth Amendment nevertheless 
made it “implausible to read the no-caste rule of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as allowing discrimination on the basis of sex with 
respect to civil rights.”164  Applying an approach similar to the one 
that Bork advocated for in Brown, in other words, creates the 
possibility of an originalist justification for the Court’s cases 
subjecting gender discrimination to heightened scrutiny. 
If we are willing to follow this approach to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, then there is no obvious reason why we would have 
to stop with discrimination on the basis of race and gender.  
Applying Bork’s approach to Brown also creates the possibility of 
an originalist justification for constitutional condemnation of 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and constitutional 
protection for rights—including the fundamental right of gay 
people to marry the same-sex partners of their choice—that, when 
viewed at a high level of specificity, do not find clear support in our 
historical traditions. 
The question whether the Fourteenth Amendment, as an 
original matter, presumptively prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation does not seem very difficult to most 
people.  Given the relatively recent vintage of societal 
condemnation of discrimination against gays and lesbians—and 
the continuing debate over whether it even ought to be 
                                                                                                               
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. at 10. 
 164 Id. at 66–67. 
GEORGIA LAW  REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/17  1:54 PM 
2017]       ORIGINALISM AND LEVEL OF GENERALITY 37 
 
prohibited—there is little doubt that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not believe that the Amendment would prohibit 
such discrimination in the same way that it prohibits (at least 
some forms of) official discrimination on the basis of race.  To 
decide that the Amendment nevertheless presumptively prohibits 
discrimination on this basis, therefore, requires one to conclude 
that the meaning of the Amendment has changed, a conclusion 
generally inconsistent with originalist interpretation.165  This, at 
least, was the thrust of Justice Scalia’s questions at oral 
arguments in Hollingsworth v. Perry,166 which involved a challenge 
(based at least in part on the Equal Protection Clause) to 
California’s ban on same-sex marriage.  He stated, “We don’t 
prescribe law for the future.  [We] decide what the law is.  I’m 
curious, when [did] it become unconstitutional to exclude 
homosexual couples from marriage? 1791? 1868, when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted?”167  When Ted Olson, the 
counsel for the respondents, responded that it became 
unconstitutional when “we . . . as a culture determined that sexual 
orientation is a characteristic of individuals that they cannot 
control,” Justice Scalia pressed him to provide the date when the 
Constitution “change[d].”168 
Seeking the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment by asking 
how the framers of the Amendment expected it to apply, in other 
words, cannot plausibly yield the conclusion that official 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is 
unconstitutional.  And even if one is willing to depart from the 
specific expectations of the framers, one cannot rely, as did 
Calabresi and Matthews in addressing official discrimination on 
the basis of gender, on the adoption of a subsequent constitutional 
amendment—in that case, the Nineteenth Amendment—that 
touches on the question.  For this reason, Calabresi declared in 
2010 that the Fourteenth Amendment, properly understood as an 
                                                                                                               
 165 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.  
 166 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).  The Court in Hollingsworth did not resolve the question, 
concluding instead that the intervenors lacked standing to appeal the district court’s 
decision.  See id. at 2656. 
 167 Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (no. 
12-144)  
 168 Id. at 39–40. 
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originalist matter, does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation.169   
Yet Calabresi and Matthews’s argument about gender 
discrimination did not rely exclusively on the Nineteenth 
Amendment.  Their argument followed from their premise that we 
should seek the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment at 
a high level of generality, reading it to prohibit caste-based 
discrimination rather than to prohibit only the certain limited 
forms of discrimination on the basis of race to which most of its 
framers would have understood it to apply.170  That argument—on 
which Calabresi relied in defending Brown and Loving on 
originalist grounds, as well—is simply a variation of the argument 
that Bork advanced in defense of Brown.171  And if we follow that 
approach, then the originalist case for prohibiting discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation becomes more plausible.   
For simplicity’s sake, consider how Bork’s approach to Brown 
applies to the case of discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.  Recall that Bork argued that Brown was correct as an 
original matter because the “purpose that brought the fourteenth 
amendment into being” was “equality,” and “equality and 
segregation were mutually inconsistent,” even “though the 
ratifiers did not understand that.”172  It does not take very much 
creative lawyering to argue, in the case of same-sex marriage, that 
even though “the ratifiers probably assumed that” bans on same-
sex marriage were “consistent with equality,” they “were not 
addressing” that practice, because the “text itself demonstrates 
                                                                                                               
 169 See Calabresi, Equal Justice, supra note 99, at 153 (concluding that “the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ban on castes” does not “bar all forms of sexual-orientation discrimination,” 
because “[n]o constitutional amendment like the Nineteenth Amendment has been adopted 
that recognizes sexual orientation as being a suspect classification,” and thus “[n]o Article V 
consensus . . . has been demonstrated”). 
 170 See Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 115, at 1412 n.65 (“[The Fourteenth 
Amendment] protects against laws that discriminate on the basis of class or caste . . . .”).  
 171 See BORK, supra note 12, at 82 (“The purpose that brought the fourteenth amendment 
into being was equality before the law . . . .”); Calabresi, Equal Justice, supra note 99, at 
151–52 (discussing Brown and Loving). 
 172 BORK, supra note 12, at 82; accord Bork, supra note 98, at 14–15 (“The Court 
must . . . choose a general principle of equality that applies to all cases.”).   
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that the equality under the law was the primary goal.”173  To be 
sure, once one is willing to extend the reach of the Equal 
Protection Clause beyond the practices that prompted its adoption, 
one must resolve the thorny question of “how far the protection of 
the clause may be extended . . . .”174  But having already 
apparently accepted that the Clause can apply to forms of 
discrimination that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
believed would be permissible, the choice to extend its reach to 
other bases for discrimination is simply an interpretive move of 
degree, not of kind. 
And, in fact, some prominent originalists have begun 
tentatively to suggest that there is an originalist justification for 
the view that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
violates the equality norms in the Fourteenth Amendment.  In 
2013, Michael Ramsey suggested that there is a “plausible,” even if 
not “conclusive,” originalist case “against sexual orientation 
discrimination.”175  He reasoned that the original public meaning 
of the Equal Protection Clause prohibited “discrimination on the 
basis of characteristics such as race,” and that although “people at 
the time the clause was adopted didn’t think” that sexual 
orientation was a characteristic like race, the “facts underlying 
sexual orientation might  . . . affect sexual orientation’s status 
under the fixed meaning of ‘equal.’ ”176  Because “[o]ur 
understanding of sexual orientation today” is “factually very 
different from the nineteenth century understanding,” we “might 
conclude that sexual orientation discrimination violates ‘equal’ 
treatment in the sense that ‘equal’ was understood by the drafters 
and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment.”177   
                                                                                                               
 173 BORK, supra note 12, at 82; see id. at 81 (arguing that “those who ratified” the 
Fourteenth Amendment “intended black equality, which they demonstrated by adopting the 
equal protection clause”). 
 174 Id. at 330. 
 175 Michael Ramsey, Is There an Originalist Case for Same-Sex Marriage?, THE 
ORIGINALISM BLOG (Mar. 25, 2013), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/ 
2013/03/is-there-an-originalist-case-for-same-sex-marriagemichael-ramsey.html. 
 176 Id.  
 177 Id.; see also Grant Darwin, Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, 16 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 237, 278–80 (2013) (arguing that a decision invalidating bans on same-sex 
marriage can be justified with an originalist approach).  
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More recently, Ilya Somin argued that bans on same-sex 
marriage are a form of impermissible discrimination on the basis 
of sex,178 presumably because “[s]ame sex marriage laws allow a 
man to marry a woman but not another man.”179  Although “most 
informed observers” in the nineteenth century “believed that all or 
nearly all sex-discriminatory laws of that era were constitutional,” 
that “conclusion was premised on factual understandings about 
women’s capabilities that have been superseded by later evidence.  
Similarly, nineteenth century (and later) support for laws 
restricting marriage on the basis of gender [was] also premised on 
factual assumptions that later evidence proves largely false.”180  
Somin asserts that these arguments are “distinctively originalist” 
because they “provide evidence that the ‘broad principle’ ”—
forbidding caste-like discrimination—“was understood to be 
included in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment at the time of 
enactment.”181  Steven Calabresi, who had asserted just a few 
years earlier that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or bans on same-
sex marriage, now apparently agrees with this view.182  If we seek 
the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause at a high level 
of generality and embrace a willingness to depart from the specific 
understanding and expectations of the framers, in other words, 
then the Clause in practice can have far-reaching application.    
                                                                                                               
 178 See Ilya Somin, William Eskridge on Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspir 
acy/wp/2015/01/23/william-eskridge-on-originalism-and-same-sex-marriage/ (“[L]aws 
forbidding same sex marriage . . . amount to unconstitutional sex discrimination.”).  
 179 Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah Besley, Gay Marriage and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
at 24 (Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 14-51, October 13, 2014), http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=2509443. 
 180 Somin, supra note 178. 
 181 Ilya Somin, Originalism is Broad Enough to Include Arguments for a Constitutional 
Right to Same-Sex Marriage, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/28/originalism-is-broad-enough-to-
include-arguments-for-a-constitutional-right-to-same-sex-marriage/. 
 182 See Calabresi & Besley, supra note 179, at 1 (providing an originalist argument that 
the Fourteenth Amendment protects same-sex marriage).   
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B.  FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
The same-sex marriage cases involved not only a claim under 
the Equal Protection Clause, but also a claim that the state bans 
impermissibly interfered with the fundamental right to marry—a 
right that, as a matter of doctrine, is protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.183  Originalists traditionally 
have been quite skeptical of constitutional protection for 
unenumerated rights.184  That skepticism has been based both on 
the normative claim that it is anti-democratic and inconsistent 
with the judicial role to invalidate popular legislation without a 
clear textual and historical warrant,185 and the interpretive claim 
that fidelity to the Constitution forecloses the possibility of judicial 
protection for rights that are not specifically mentioned in the 
constitutional text or clearly within the contemplation of the 
framers.186  
Consider Robert Bork’s approach to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection for unenumerated rights.  In Bork’s view, 
Griswold v. Connecticut187 and Roe v. Wade188—to take two 
prominent examples—were indefensible on originalist grounds 
because contraception is not “covered specifically or by obvious 
implication by any provision of the Constitution,” and “the right to 
abort, whatever one thinks of it, is not to be found in the 
Constitution.”189  Bork, in other words, sought the original 
meaning at a very low level of generality when the question was 
                                                                                                               
 183 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015) (“The Court now holds that 
same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry.”).  
 184 See, e.g., Bork, supra note 98, at 9 (“When the Constitution has not spoken, the Court 
will be able to find no scale, other than its own value preferences, upon which to weigh the 
respective claims . . . .”). 
 185 See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE 4 (1987) 
(“[J]udicial review is legitimate only when courts adhere strictly to the text of the 
Constitution.”); Bork, supra note 98, at 10 (“Where the Constitution does not embody the 
moral or ethical choice, the judge has basis other than his own values upon which to set 
aside the community judgment embodied in the statute.  That, by definition, is an 
inadequate basis for judicial supremacy.”). 
 186 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 12, at 117–19, 125, 133; BORK, supra note 12, at 185. 
 187 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 188 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 189 BORK, supra note 12, at 112, 258; see also id. at 113–14. 
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whether the Constitution protected unenumerated rights.190  For 
Bork, the case was even clearer because the Court’s decisions in 
Griswold and Roe, like the incorporation cases that preceded them, 
anchored the rights in question in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Bork argued that the “transformation of 
the due process clause from a procedural to a substantive 
requirement was an obvious sham.”191  He noted, as had John Hart 
Ely, that “‘substantive due process’ is a contradiction in 
terms. . . .”192  
Bork’s view about substantive due process was long the 
conventional view among originalists.  Raoul Berger asserted that 
the concept of due process plainly “did not comprehend judicial 
power to override legislation on substantive or policy grounds.”193  
He called the doctrine of substantive due process (in what he 
obviously did not intend as a compliment) “largely a product of the 
post-1937 era,” at least to the extent that its application was 
“libertarian” in nature, and thus unmoored from the historical 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.194  Justice Scalia 
similarly has repeatedly “reject[ed] the proposition that the Due 
Process Clause guarantees certain (unspecified) liberties, rather 
than merely guarantees certain procedures as a prerequisite to 
deprivation of liberty.”195  On this view, judicial protection for 
substantive rights under the Due Process Clause is self-evidently 
incorrect, and thus must be incorrect as an original matter, 
because the very concept of “substantive due process” is 
“oxymoronic.”196 
                                                                                                               
 190 See Colby & Smith, supra note 14, at 586 (“Bork argued that judges should decline to 
find any specific rights in [the Privilege or Immunity Clause]’s capacious language.”).  
 191 BORK, supra note 12, at 31. 
 192 Id. at 32. 
 193 BERGER, supra note 12, at 194. 
 194 Id. at 140; see also id. at 249–50 (criticizing substantive due process). 
 195 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring); accord McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting his “misgivings” 
about substantive due process).  Justice Scalia has declared that he was willing to make an 
exception in the case of incorporation of substantive rights specifically mentioned in the Bill 
of Rights, but only because the Court’s practice of doing so “is both long established and 
narrowly limited.”  Albright, 510 U.S. at 275. 
 196 Lino A. Graglia, Originalism and the Constitution: Does Originalism Always Provide 
the Answer?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 77 (2011). 
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At the core of the traditional originalist objection to judicial 
protection for unenumerated rights, however, is the concern that, 
without specific guidance from the constitutional text, judges 
would simply impose their own policy preferences under the guise 
of interpretation, a practice that most originalists find both 
lawless and anti-democratic.197  This concern helps to explain why 
Bork and other originalists have maintained this view even in the 
face of substantial historical evidence that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment understood the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause (even if not the Due Process Clause) to protect 
unenumerated fundamental rights.  The historical record is far too 
rich for anything other than a cursory treatment here, but for 
present purposes it suffices to note that the framers of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment repeatedly 
declared that those enactments would protect “[s]uch fundamental 
rights as belong to every free person.”198  As Senator Jacob 
Howard, the principal sponsor of the Amendment in the Senate, 
explained, the Amendment would protect not only “the personal 
rights guarant[e]ed and secured by the first eight amendments,” 
but also the “privileges and immunities spoken of in” Article IV, a 
category that was understood to refer to natural rights and thus 
that “cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise 
nature.”199  The debates are filled with uncontradicted assertions 
that the Amendment would “give to a citizen of the United States 
the natural rights which necessarily pertain to citizenship.”200 
Notwithstanding this evidence, Bork categorically rejected the 
position that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects 
unenumerated rights, arguing instead that judges should decline 
to find any specific rights in that clause’s seemingly capacious 
                                                                                                               
 197 See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 185, at 4–5 (discussing the importance of 
strict adherence to the text of the Constitution). 
 198 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull). 
 199 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard). 
 200 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 1088 (1866) (statement of Rep. Woodbridge).  See 
BARNETT, supra note 31, at 60–68 (discussing members of the 39th Congress’s view on the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 28 (1980) 
(noting that Senator Howard’s speech provides support for a broad interpretation of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause).  See generally MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL 
ABRIDGE (1986) (discussing incorporation); cf. BARNETT, supra note 31, at 54–60 (addressing 
historical understandings of the Ninth Amendment); ELY, supra, at 34–41 (same). 
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language.201  The clause is phrased so broadly, he argued, as to 
make its meaning a complete “mystery.”202  And a “provision whose 
meaning cannot be ascertained is precisely like a provision that is 
written in Sanskrit or is obliterated past deciphering by an ink 
blot.  No judge is entitled to interpret an ink blot on the ground 
that there must be something under it.”203  Bork’s approach was 
based both on the assumption that the framers could not possibly 
have intended to vest unelected judges with the power to 
determine and enforce unenumerated rights204 and the concern 
that judicial reliance on vague constitutional language to produce 
specific results inevitably would be simply a guise for judicial 
willfulness,205 the precise practice that gave rise to the need for 
originalism in the first place.206   
Justice Scalia’s approach to unenumerated rights was similar, 
though he had very little to say about the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause and its original meaning.  He has serious 
“misgivings . . . as an original matter” about judicial protection for 
unenumerated rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,207 but 
(presumably as a matter of stare decisis) he has not urged the 
wholesale overruling of the Court’s cases protecting substantive 
rights under the Due Process Clause.  Instead, he has insisted that 
the Court can protect unenumerated rights only when a “relevant 
tradition,” defined at the “most specific level,” protecting the right 
“can be identified.”208  For Justice Scalia, then, judges interpreting 
the Fourteenth Amendment should seek the original meaning at 
the lowest possible level of generality.  Under this approach, 
women do not enjoy a constitutional right to obtain an abortion, 
                                                                                                               
 201 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.  
 202 BORK, supra note 12, at 166. 
 203 Id.   
 204 See id. at 180–85. 
 205 Bork, supra note 98, at 8 (“Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the 
value to be preferred, there is no principled way to prefer any claimed human value to any 
other.”). 
 206 See BERGER, supra note 12, at 1 (“The Fourteenth Amendment is the case study par 
excellence of . . . the Supreme Court’s . . . continuing revision of the Constitution under the 
guise of interpretation.”); see also id. at 116–31 (rejecting the “ ‘Open-Ended’ Phraseology 
Theory” of constitutional interpretation).  
 207 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 208 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.7 (1989). 
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because “(1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and 
(2) the longstanding traditions of American society have permitted 
it to be legally proscribed.”209  Similarly, on this view, the 
Constitution does not protect a fundamental right of same-sex 
couples to marry, because it is not plausible—indeed, it is, as 
Justice Scalia has stated, “absurd”—to suggest that the specific 
right of a person to marry a person of the same gender is “deeply 
rooted in this nation’s history and traditions.”210  There is little 
doubt that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
understand the Amendment to protect a right of women to obtain 
abortions211 or of same-sex couples to marry.212  This was, in 
essence, Justice Scalia’s approach in Obergefell.213  
But we might arrive at a very different set of conclusions both 
about the Constitution’s protection for unenumerated rights—
including the right to marry, and the derivative right to marry a 
person of the same sex—if we follow the approach that Bork and 
others have used to justify Brown (and Loving and the Court’s sex-
discrimination cases) on originalist grounds.  That is, if 
originalism permits us to depart from the specific, subjective 
understandings and expectations of the framers and instead to 
seek the broad principle embodied in the text, and then to apply 
that principle to new circumstances not within the contemplation 
                                                                                                               
 209 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 210 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2707 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)). 
 211 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 177 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“There 
apparently was no question concerning the validity of [state bans on abortion] when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.  The only conclusion possible from this history is that 
the drafters did not intend to have the Fourteenth Amendment withdraw from the States 
the power to legislate with respect to this matter.”). 
 212 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2718 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[I]t would have been hard at the 
time of the adoption of the Constitution or the Fifth Amendment to find Americans who did 
not take the traditional view [of marriage] for granted.”). 
 213 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2628 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“When it 
comes to determining the meaning of a vague constitutional provision—such as ‘due process 
of law’ or ‘equal protection of the laws’—it is unquestionable that the People who ratified 
that provision did not understand it to prohibit a practice that remained both universal and 
uncontroversial in the years after ratification.”); see also id. at 2614 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (“There is no dispute that every State at the founding—and every State 
throughout our history until a dozen years ago—defined marriage in the traditional, 
biologically rooted way.”). 
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of the framers, then we can construct a plausible originalist 
justification for the existence of a wide range of unenumerated 
rights.214  The assertion that the framers could not have intended 
for unelected judges to give content to vague rights-granting 
provisions—“itself a contested twentieth-century projection rather 
than a supported and historically contextualized assertion”215—
would no longer be dispositive.  Instead, the crucial fact would be 
that the Constitution seems fairly clearly to acknowledge (in the 
Ninth Amendment) the existence of unenumerated rights216 and 
includes provisions such as the Privileges or Immunities Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment that, objectively speaking, are written 
at such a high level of generality as necessarily to include within 
their scope a variety of unspecified rights.217   
Nor would the faithful originalist need to confine that category 
of rights to rights with historical roots dating back to the framing 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, because (again) we no longer need 
to ascertain original meaning by seeking to determine how the 
framers would personally have answered the narrow question at 
issue.  And, in fact, there is evidence that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment drafted it “at a higher level of abstraction 
or generality—that of natural liberty rights—than any specific list 
of liberties and deliberately so,” precisely because the framers 
                                                                                                               
 214 See Whittington, supra note 10, at 609 (“[N]ew originalism open[s] up space for 
originalists to reconsider the meaning of . . . rights-oriented aspects of the 
Constitution . . . .”).  Although no one would accuse Justice Kennedy of taking an originalist 
approach in his opinion for the Court in Obergefell, see 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (“The generations 
that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume 
to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future 
generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its 
meaning.”), his approach arguably was consistent with Bork’s approach to Brown, at least 
in its treatment of Loving and other cases that involved the right to marry, see id. at 2602 
(“Loving did not ask about a ‘right to interracial marriage’; Turner did not ask about a ‘right 
of inmates to marry’; and Zablocki did not ask about a ‘right of fathers with unpaid child 
support duties to marry.’  Rather, each case inquired about the right to marry in its 
comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification for excluding the relevant 
class from the right.”).  
 215 Colby & Smith, supra note 14, at 166. 
 216 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). 
 217 See Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 4099504, at *8–21 
(summarizing research about the scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
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understood that it would be impossible and unwise to list all of the 
fundamental rights with which the government might someday 
interfere.218  Just as some originalists read the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s anti-discrimination principle to prohibit forms of 
discrimination that the framers of the Amendment believed would 
be left untouched, originalists can read the Amendment’s 
protection for fundamental rights to accommodate evolving 
conceptions of rights.  On this view, there is an originalist 
justification for the Court’s conclusion in Obergefell that the states 
cannot interfere with an individual’s right to marry a person of the 
same sex.219 
And, indeed, some originalists have already begun the project of 
supplying originalist justifications for interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment (and the Ninth Amendment) to protect a wide range 
of rights beyond marriage.  Randy Barnett, for example, has 
carefully developed and supported the argument that originalism 
requires judges to protect unenumerated rights, including 
economic rights such as the freedom of contract.220  Barnett’s 
approach is based on the premise that the proper object in 
constitutional interpretation is to determine the “objective 
meaning that a reasonable listener would place on the words used” 
in the text, rather than “how the relevant generation of ratifiers 
expected or intended their textual handiwork would be applied to 
specific cases.”221  In addition, because the rights-granting 
provisions of the Constitution are objectively framed at a high 
level of generality, Barnett argues that originalism properly 
understood requires us to seek the meaning of those provisions at 
that high level of generality, and then to endeavor to apply it to 
modern circumstances.222  This is, in effect, the approach that Bork 
                                                                                                               
 218 BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 258. 
 219 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (“[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right 
inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that 
right and that liberty.”). 
 220 See BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 255–69 (providing an originalist 
justification for judicial protection of certain unenumerated rights); see also Colby & Smith, 
supra note 14, at 527 (“[Originalism] has now evolved to the point where it can plausibly 
accommodate claims that the Constitution protects economic liberty.”) . 
 221 BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 92–93. 
 222 See id. at 119–20. 
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proposed to justify Brown on originalist grounds.  Jack Balkin has 
followed a similar approach in offering an originalist justification 
for the right to an abortion.223 
IV.  ORIGINALISM AND LEVEL OF GENERALITY 
What accounts for this staggering range of conclusions by 
originalists about how to choose a level of generality at which to 
seek the original meaning?  Part of the answer lies in the evolution 
of originalist thought itself.  As noted earlier, the old originalism 
sought principally to effectuate a limited vision of the judicial role, 
a goal best achieved by limiting the range of constitutional rights 
on which judges can rely to invalidate popular decision making.  
Accordingly, the old originalism sought the original intent at the 
most specific level of generality.224  But the limits of this 
approach—including its inability to justify foundational cases such 
as Brown and Loving—led originalists to modify their approach.225 
Many new originalists—in particular, academic new 
originalists—have taken a different approach to selecting the level 
of generality at which to seek the original meaning.  They have 
generally concluded that the “level of generality at which terms 
were defined is not an a priori theoretical question but a 
contextualized historical one.”226  Accordingly, as Randy Barnett 
has explained, “part of finding original meaning is determining the 
level of generality with which a particular term was used.”227  
Consistent with the focus on objective original meaning, Barnett 
has argued that the originalist should “identify the level of 
                                                                                                               
 223 See BALKIN, supra note 105, at 214–19; Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original 
Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007) (developing an originalist argument for a 
constitutional right to abortion). 
 224 See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text; see also ); Brest, Misconceived Quest, 
supra note 18, at 204–05 (distinguishing between “strict” and “moderate” originalism); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 312–13 (1996) 
(distinguishing between “hard” and “soft” originalism). 
 225 See supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text. 
 226 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 187 (1999). 
 227 BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 120. 
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generality in which the Constitution is objectively expressed.”228  
The natural consequence of such an approach—which recognizes 
that “[t]he proper level of generality for the constitutional 
principles in the text is the one we find in the text itself”229—is 
that we should seek the meaning of most of the Constitution’s 
rights-granting provisions at a high level of generality.  Indeed, 
because those provisions were “deliberately” framed at a high level 
of abstraction,230 their text might even “point to the possibility of 
new principles,” and thus new rights.231 
Professions of fidelity to this approach to determining the 
proper level of generality are not unique to a small cadre of new 
originalists intent on unsettling the conventional understanding of 
what originalism entails.  Michael McConnell, for example, argued 
in 1997 that originalists should seek the original meaning at “the 
level of generality at which the particular language was 
understood by its Framers.”232  And even Robert Bork, who at one 
time was in the vanguard of the old originalism, eventually came 
to the view that part of the originalist’s task in ascertaining the 
original meaning of the text is to find “its degree of generality, 
which is part of its meaning,” and then to “apply that text to a 
particular situation.”233  In seeking to interpret the “broadly 
stated” rights-granting provisions, Bork asserted, the “judge 
should state the principle at the level of generality that the text 
and historical evidence warrant.”234 
                                                                                                               
 228 Barnett, Infidelity, supra note 29, at 23; see also Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 359 
(“Thus the question becomes the level of generality the ratifiers and other sophisticated 
political actors at the time would have imputed to the text.”). 
 229 BALKIN, supra note 105, at 263. 
 230 BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 258. 
 231 BALKIN, supra note 105, at 266. 
 232 McConnell, supra note 29, at 1280. 
 233 BORK, supra note 12, at 149.  
 234 Id.  Cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s 
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 672–73 (2009) (noting that some provisions of the 
Constitution “employ standards and not rules,” and arguing that “[i]t is not an adequate 
answer in these situations to say, as Justice Scalia sometimes did, that originalist judges 
ought not to enforce Clauses of this kind because they do not lend themselves to principled 
judicial application”).  But see McGinnis & Rappaport, Abstract Meaning, supra note 32, at 
741 (criticizing new originalists for assuming that broad language should be understood at a 
high level of generality rather than pursuing other, equally plausible (and more narrow) 
ways of reading the language). 
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Given the examples discussed above, one can be forgiven for 
wondering whether this approach has been consistently and 
conscientiously followed in practice; it is far from clear that the 
variation in the level of generality at which originalists seek 
constitutional meaning can be explained solely by reference to the 
level of abstraction at which the constitutional text is expressed.  I 
will have more to say about this problem shortly, but even 
assuming consistent adherence to this approach, it creates the 
very problem that the old originalism was designed to address.  
The old originalism was concerned with both judicial restraint 
and judicial constraint.235  The “primary commitment” of the old 
originalism was to the former, in that “originalism was married to 
a requirement of judicial deference to legislative majorities.”236  As 
Lino Graglia argued, the old originalism was designed to 
“minimize the conflict between judicial review and democracy” by 
generally “permit[ting] the results of the democratic political 
process to stand.”237   If judges may invalidate democratic action 
only when required by the specific “principles actually laid down in 
the historic Constitution,” then there will be fewer occasions for 
the exercise of judicial review and correspondingly more space for 
the operation of ordinary majoritarian decision making.238  
As noted above, the new originalism is self-consciously less 
concerned with restraint than was the old originalism.  If 
“originalism is warranted as a theory of interpretation—that is, as 
                                                                                                               
 235 See Colby & Smith, supra note 14, at 583 (“[T]he old originalism was at its core deeply 
concerned with both judicial constraint—narrowing the discretion of judges—and judicial 
restraint—deferring to democratic majorities.”). 
 236 Whittington, supra note 10, at 602; see also Earl M. Maltz, The Prospects for a Revival 
of Conservative Activism in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV. 629, 632 (1990) 
(“[T]he appeal to democratic theory only makes sense if originalism is combined with a 
general preference for judicial restraint.”). 
 237 Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 
1026 (1992). 
 238 BORK, supra note 12, at 163; accord Bork, supra note 98, at 10–11 (stating that courts 
should adhere to legislative value choices); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 185, at 4 
(“[J]udicial review is legitimate only when courts adhere strictly to the text of the 
Constitution.”).  The old originalism was primarily a response to the perceived excesses of 
the Warren Court.  See Whittington, supra note 10, at 601 (stating that “originalism was 
largely developed as a model of criticism of” the actions of the Warren and Burger Courts).  
See generally Colby & Smith, Lochner, supra note 14 (discussing the evolution of legal 
movements). 
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a method of determining the meaning of the words written in the 
Constitution”239—then fidelity to the original meaning of the text, 
rather than judicial restraint, must be the operative principle.  To 
the new originalist, “a commitment to originalism is distinct from 
a commitment to judicial deference,” and originalism “may often 
require the active exercise of the power of judicial review in order 
to keep faith with the principled commitments of the founding.”240  
When those commitments are phrased at a high level of generality, 
fidelity to the text might require giving them a broad sweep and 
application, even if this results in a greater potential for displacing 
majoritarian decision making.  To the new originalist, this is 
simply the price of fidelity to the Constitution, which (after all) 
would be largely unnecessary if we were convinced that 
majoritarian decision-making should always prevail.  
But proponents of the old originalism were also concerned with 
judicial constraint—that is, with narrowing the discretion of 
judges to rely on subjective value judgments in deciding 
constitutional questions.241  As Robert Bork argued, “The only way 
in which the Constitution can constrain judges is if the judges 
interpret the document’s words according to the intentions of those 
who drafted, proposed, and ratified its provisions and its various 
amendments.”242  On this view, originalism is constraining because 
it supplies a “historical criterion that is conceptually quite 
separate from the preferences of the judge himself.”243 
Although the new originalism has more or less abandoned its 
predecessor’s devotion to judicial restraint, it has largely 
maintained its professed commitment to judicial constraint, albeit 
                                                                                                               
 239 Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
101, 108 (2001). 
 240 Whittington, supra note 10, at 609. 
 241 See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
 242 Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 823, 826 (1986). 
 243 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989); accord 
BERGER, supra note 12, at 284–86 (arguing that reliance on original intent forecloses 
judicial value choices); Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 106 
(1989) (“A central concern of originalism is that judges be constrained by the law rather 
than be left free to act according to their own [interests].”). 
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with less certainty than did proponents of the old originalism.244  
The new originalists’ claim is, essentially, that judges applying the 
approach are “constrained by their obligation to remain faithful to 
the original meaning,”245 which requires a historical inquiry rather 
than an unguided exploration of morality and social policy.  At a 
minimum, then, new originalists contend that “although their 
theory does not completely eliminate judicial subjectivity and the 
potential for judicial mischief, it is still meaningfully constraining, 
at least in comparison to the alternatives.”246 
Tom Colby has demonstrated why new originalists’ claims 
about constraint are unconvincing.247  As should be apparent from 
the examples discussed above, the new originalism’s willingness to 
seek the original meaning at a high level of abstraction inevitably 
leaves considerable room for judicial creativity, and thus holds less 
promise for judicial constraint. 
Indeed, many new originalists have conceded that originalism 
alone often is not sufficient to resolve constitutional cases 
involving provisions that are couched in abstract terms and that 
lack clear, rule-like commands.  Once one acknowledges that the 
original meaning of abstractly phrased provisions should be 
ascertained at a correspondingly high level of abstraction, it 
becomes inevitable that the original meaning of some of those 
provisions will be “underdeterminate.”248  In some cases, “the 
principle established by the text may be unclear;” in others, the 
text might “specify a principle that is itself identifiable,” but the 
principle might be “indeterminate in its application to a particular 
situation.”249  Either way, “[t]raditional tools of interpretive 
analysis can be exhausted without providing a constitutional 
                                                                                                               
 244 See Whittington, supra note 10, at 608–09 (noting that “there seems to be less 
emphasis on the capacity of originalism to limit the discretion of the judge,” and that the 
“new originalist . . . is unlikely to argue that only originalist methodology can prevent 
judicial abuses or can eliminate the need for judicial judgment”). 
 245 Colby, supra note 18, at 751. 
 246 Id.  
 247 See id. at 751–756 (“How can a theory that interprets the most contentious 
constitutional clauses at a very high level of abstraction claim to be any more constraining 
than other methods of constitutional interpretation?”). 
 248 Barnett, supra note 239, at 108. 
 249 WHITTINGTON, supra note 32, at 8. 
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meaning that is sufficiently clear to guide government action.”250  
In such cases, the act of interpretation—that is, of discerning “the 
communicative content (linguistic meaning) of the constitutional 
text”251—“runs out,” and we must instead turn to the process of 
“construction” to formulate rules and standards to apply the 
abstract principles in the text to concrete cases.252  Constitutional 
construction thus seeks to produce constitutional law that is 
“consistent with [the] original meaning but not deducible from 
it.”253  As should be clear from this account of the relationship 
between interpretation and construction, the new originalism 
leaves significant discretion to judges charged with deciding 
constitutional cases.254  
We might ask, moreover, whether originalism has actually been 
constraining in practice, once the interpreter is willing to seek the 
original meaning at a level of generality higher than the level at 
which Raoul Berger would have sought it.  The examples above 
suggest that the selection of the level of generality provides a 
substantial amount of room for an originalist to profess fidelity to 
the original meaning while ensuring desired outcomes.  But the 
problem is not simply that some originalists are more willing than 
others to seek the original meaning at a higher level of generality.  
The problem is that many originalists seem to vary the level of 
generality at which they seek meaning, from constitutional 
provision to provision or issue to issue, in ways that cannot be 
explained by simple reference to the level of generality at which 
the text is expressed.   
We have already seen that Robert Bork, a founding father of the 
modern originalist movement, sought the original meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause at a much higher level of generality, in 
seeking to justify Brown, than he sought the original meaning of 
                                                                                                               
 250 Id.  
 251 Solum, Construction, supra note 32, at 457. 
 252 Solum, supra note 26, at 20. 
 253 BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 121; see also Colby, supra note 18, at 734 
(“There can be no originalist answer to the question of which construction to apply; by 
definition, construction supplements interpretation and cannot be dictated by it.”). 
 254 See, e.g., JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION 151 (2013) (arguing that “[c]onstructionist originalism is likely to reach 
inconsistent and ad hoc results”). 
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the Privileges or Immunities Clause, a potential source of a range 
of individual rights, even though both are objectively expressed at 
a high level of generality.255  Bork was also sometimes willing to 
interpret the First Amendment at a relatively high level of 
generality, at least in determining its application to suits for libel.  
In Ollman v. Evans, an en banc case decided when Bork was a 
judge on the D.C. Circuit, Bork acknowledged that “[w]e know very 
little of the precise intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the 
speech and press clauses of the first amendment.”256  But, he 
continued, “we do know that they gave into our keeping the value 
of preserving free expression and, in particular, the preservation of 
political expression, which is commonly conceded to be the value at 
the core of those clauses.”257  Accordingly, even though “the 
framers” might not have “envision[ed] libel actions as a major 
threat to that freedom,” judges should “adapt their doctrines” over 
time if the “libel action becomes a threat to the central meaning of 
the first amendment. . . .”258   
Yet when the question was the scope of the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment, he sought the original meaning at 
a much lower level of generality.  He asserted that “[a]s an original 
matter, the clause might have extended no further than a 
prohibition against the government’s recognition of an official 
church or the favoring of some religions over others.”259  He then 
relied on the expectations of the framers about how the clause 
would apply, reasoning that the first Congress, “many of whose 
members were also members of the Philadelphia convention or of 
the various state ratifying conventions, and hence aware of what 
the clause was intended to mean, adopted legislation that 
demonstrated that they did not think the ‘wall of separation 
between church and state . . . was as severe and complete as the 
Court has now made it.”260  On this basis, he criticized most of the 
                                                                                                               
 255 See supra notes 93–99, 137–138 and accompanying text. 
 256 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring). 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id.  See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Lauren Pope, Judge Robert H. Bork and 
Constitutional Change: An Essay on Ollman v. Evans, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 155 
(2013) (discussing Bork’s concurrence in Ollman). 
 259 BORK, supra note 12, at 95. 
 260 Id. 
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Court’s modern cases interpreting the Establishment Clause, and 
in particular, cases prohibiting prayer in schools.261 
Justice Scalia, another founding father of the modern 
originalist movement—and who ushered in the new originalism by 
leading the “campaign to change the label from the Doctrine of 
Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning”262—similarly 
varied the level of generality at which he sought the meaning of 
the constitutional text.  Justice Scalia sometimes sought the 
original meaning at a high level of generality.  As with many other 
originalists today, Justice Scalia suggested that Brown was 
consistent with the original meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  In a book with Bryan Garner, for example, he asserted 
that the text of the Equal Protection Clause “can reasonably be 
thought to prohibit all laws designed to assert the separateness 
and superiority of the white race, even those that purport to treat 
the races equally.”263  To be sure, as noted above Brown is an 
unusual (and fraught) example; but Justice Scalia was willing to 
seek the original meaning at a level of abstraction higher than 
that warranted by the specific understanding and expectations of 
the framers in other contexts, as well.   
For example, in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission,264 Justice Scalia wrote separately to take issue with 
Justice Stevens’s account of the framers’ view of corporate 
speech.265  Rather than focus on the framers’ specific view of the 
                                                                                                               
 261 See id. (“The Court has adopted a rigidly secularist view of the establishment 
clause . . . .”). 
 262 Antonin Scalia, Address by Justice Antonin Scalia in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 
1986), in OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 185, at 6. 
 263 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 101, at 88.  Justice Scalia has declared, however, that he 
would limit the reach of the equality mandate to laws that discriminate on the basis of race.  
See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 564 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (announcing that he 
will apply the “permissive McCulloch standard” for Congress’s power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment only “to congressional measures designed to remedy racial 
discrimination by the States,” not other forms of discrimination).  But he still argued that 
the Equal Protection Clause prohibited segregated schools even though the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not expect it to do so.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra 
note 168, at 38 (responding to a lawyer who asked, “When did it become unconstitutional to 
assign children to separate schools?” by stating, “It’s an easy question, I think, for that one.  
At the time that the Equal Protection Clause was adopted.  That’s absolutely true.”). 
 264 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 265 See id. at 392–93 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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right of corporations to engage in speech—or whether corporate 
speech was originally understood to count as “speech” within the 
meaning of the Amendment—Justice Scalia focused on the fact 
that the constitutional text “makes no distinction between types of 
speakers.”266  Because the “Amendment is written in terms of 
‘speech,’ not speakers,” Justice Scalia reasoned that its “text offers 
no foothold for excluding any category of speaker,” including 
“incorporated associations of individuals.”267  Justice Scalia 
conceded that the framers’ views about corporations might be 
relevant “insofar as it can be thought to be reflected in the 
understood meaning of the text they enacted,” but he did not 
(unlike Justice Stevens) engage in any historical inquiry beyond 
focusing on the word “speech” to determine that “understood 
meaning.”268  In other words, Justice Scalia eschewed the framers’ 
specific understanding of and expectation about how corporate 
speech would be treated under the First Amendment, focusing 
instead on the broad sweep of the word “speech.”   
Justice Scalia was also willing to apply the constitutional text 
to technologies and media that did not exist at the time of the 
adoption of the relevant provision.  For example, Justice Scalia 
concluded that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment 
protects violent video games from content-based regulation,269 and 
that the Fourth Amendment limits the use of thermal-imaging 
technology outside of a home.270  This approach necessarily entails 
interpretation at something other than the lowest possible level of 
generality, because it presupposes that some broader principle 
that underlies the text—in the case of the Free Speech clause, that 
protected speech “communicate[s] ideas,”271 and in the case of the 
                                                                                                               
 266 Id. at 386. 
 267 Id. at 392–93. 
 268 Id. at 386. 
 269 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 5644 S. Ct. 786, 790 (2011) (Scalia, J.) (reasoning that 
“ ‘the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s 
command, do not vary’ when a new and different medium for communication appears”). 
 270 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (Scalia, J.) (“It would be foolish to 
contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been 
entirely unaffected by the advance of technology . . . .  To withdraw protection of this 
minimum expectation [of privacy in the home] would be to permit police technology to erode 
the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 271 Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. at 790. 
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Fourth Amendment, that a search is government action that 
interferes with “the right of a man to retreat into his own home 
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion”272—
should be applied in ways that the framers of the text could not 
have anticipated or foreseen.   
Justice Scalia sought the original meaning at an even higher 
level of generality when addressing the constitutionality of official 
race-conscious affirmative action programs.273  In concluding that 
such programs violate the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Scalia 
relied on the fact that the conventional justification for such 
programs—to remedy the effects of non-specific past societal 
discrimination—“is alien to the Constitution’s focus upon the 
individual,” a focus that Justice Scalia substantiated by invoking 
the Equal Protection Clause’s explicit protection for “person[s],” 
rather than groups.274  Justice Scalia reached this conclusion even 
though there is ample historical evidence that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not understand it to prohibit race-
conscious measures to address the effects of past discrimination.275   
                                                                                                               
 272 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31. 
 273 See Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 356 (“In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., Justice 
Scalia . . . . treated the Equal Protection Clause as the source of a simple but exceedingly 
general rule . . . .”). 
 274 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment).  Justice Scalia did not provide an originalist defense 
for why this principle—phrased as it is at a high level of generality—applies to race-
conscious actions by the federal government.  Indeed, if it is difficult to construct an 
originalist argument for Brown v. Board of Education, it is close to impossible to construct 
one for Bolling v. Sharpe.  See 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (“In view of our decision that the 
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it 
would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal 
Government.”).   
 275 For example, in 1866, the Thirty-Ninth Congress—the same Congress that drafted and 
passed the Fourteenth Amendment—passed a statute authorizing the Freedmen’s Bureau 
(which was created to help freed slaves) to provide special assistance to African Americans 
that would not be available to white citizens.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3842–50 
(1866) (Senate vote); id. at 3850 (House vote).  The following year, the Fortieth Congress—
the same Congress that imposed Reconstruction to force the southern states to ratify the 
Fourteenth Amendment—enacted a statute providing money for “destitute colored persons” 
in Washington, D.C.  Resolution of March 16, 1867, 15 Stat. 20.  And in the years after the 
Civil War, Congress enacted many other appropriations for “colored” soldiers and sailors of 
the Union Army.  All of these programs were open only to African Americans—even African 
Americans who had not been slaves—and were adopted over objections from opponents that 
such racially exclusive measures were unfair to poor whites and were thus racially 
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This refusal to be bound by the specific expectations of the 
framers is perhaps not surprising, given Justice Scalia’s repeated 
assertion that the original meaning of the text, rather than the 
subjective intentions of the framers, should control.  Indeed, 
Justice Scalia argued that the specific expectations of the framers 
about how the constitutional text would apply are not the 
appropriate interpretive object in the search for original meaning.  
In a colloquy with Ronald Dworkin about constitutional 
interpretation, Justice Scalia declared that he follows “what the 
text would reasonably be understood to mean,” rather than the 
“concrete expectations of lawgivers.”276 
Of course, even taking Justice Scalia at his word, it is not at all 
clear that in practice there is a meaningful difference between 
original-meaning originalism, on the one hand, and original-intent 
or original-expected-application originalism, on the other, at least 
when one does not seek the former at a high level of generality.  To 
be sure, many originalists have dedicated significant time and 
effort to the task of demonstrating that, as a matter of theory, we 
ought to seek the original meaning and not the original intent or 
the framers’ subjective expectations about how the text would 
apply.277  But whatever one can say about the theoretical 
differences between the varying objects of originalist 
interpretation, in practice the inquiry to determine the objective 
original meaning inevitably will turn, at least in part, on the same 
types of evidence that are relevant to demonstrating the framers’ 
                                                                                                               
discriminatory.  See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754 (1985) (discussing “social welfare 
programs” during reconstruction). 
 276 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 144 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 277 See Colby & Smith, supra note 24, at 249–55.  These efforts arose, at least initially, in 
response to devastating critiques by Jeff Powell and Paul Brest, among others, to original-
intent originalism.  See supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text.  Later, arguments in 
favor of original-meaning originalism over original-intent or original-expected-applications 
originalism became part of a more general project of justifying originalism as an 
interpretive, rather than a normative, theory.  See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 25, at 1834 
(“Interpretation must precede evaluation, rather than vice versa.  The Constitution’s merit 
as a constitution depends on its meaning, and one should not prejudge that question by 
allowing preconceptions about merit to affect the interpretative enterprise.”). 
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original intentions or expectations about how the text should 
apply.278   
Justice Scalia, for example, declared that he looks to The 
Federalist and writings by other participants in the framing “not 
because they were Framers and therefore their intent is 
authoritative and must be the law; but rather because their 
writings, like those of other intelligent and informed people of the 
time, display how the text of the Constitution was originally 
understood.”279  I am willing to take at face value Justice Scalia’s 
explanation for why he relied on such materials, but one cannot 
avoid noting that someone seeking the original intent or original 
expected application likely would rely on the very same materials.  
Evidence of original intent and original expected applications, in 
other words, is also (generally speaking) evidence of how the 
constitutional text would have been understood by the 
hypothetical reasonable person,280 and thus its objective original 
meaning.281  
But even assuming that there is a meaningful difference 
between an inquiry seeking the original objective public meaning 
(at a relatively specific level of generality) and one seeking the 
original expected application of the text, Justice Scalia did not 
consistently eschew the latter.  I have already described Justice 
Scalia’s view that the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee 
a right of same-sex couples to marry, because in 1868 “no one 
                                                                                                               
 278 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 
1686, 1689–1701 (2012) (noting that despite the rise of original-meaning originalism, the 
founders’ intentions continue to be relevant to modern constitutional theorists).  
 279 Scalia, supra note 276, at 38. 
 280 See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. 
COMMENT. 47, 48–49 (2006) (“[T]he weight of originalist opinion today supports the view 
that the Constitution’s meaning is to be found in the hypothetical mind of the reasonable 
person . . . .”). 
 281 See, e.g., BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 60–68 (relying heavily on statements 
of members of the Reconstruction Congress in seeking to ascertain the original public 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1133 
(2003) (examining the role of records from the Constitutional Convention in interpreting the 
Constitution, and concluding that they provide “rich insight into original linguistic 
meaning”); McConnell, supra note 43, at 957–1093 (relying on statements of members of 
Congress in the 1860s and 1870s to ascertain the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
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doubted the constitutionality” of laws limiting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples;282 and his view that discrimination on the 
basis of gender should not, as an original matter, give rise to any 
special concern under the Equal Protection Clause, because 
“nobody ever thought that that’s what it meant.”283  Justice Scalia 
also relied on the framers’ expectations in concluding that capital 
punishment does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishments.284  He acknowledged that the 
Amendment enacts “an abstract principle,” because (as in the case 
of the First and Fourth Amendments) it must be capable of 
application “to all sorts of torture quite unknown at the time the 
Eighth Amendment was adopted.”285  But he then asserted that 
the principle that it “abstracts” is the founding “society’s 
assessment of what is cruel,” and thus is “rooted in the moral 
perceptions of the time.”286  As such, “capital punishment, which 
was widely in use in 1791, does not violate the abstract moral 
principle of the Eighth Amendment.”287  For Justice Scalia, 
“provision for the death penalty [in the Fifth Amendment’s 
reference to “capital” crimes] in a Constitution that sets forth the 
moral principle of ‘no cruel punishments’ ” was “conclusive 
evidence that the death penalty is not (in the moral view of the 
Constitution) cruel.”288      
In other words, because the framers of the Eighth Amendment 
did not believe that capital punishment was cruel and unusual 
punishment, it cannot (for constitutional purposes) be considered 
cruel and unusual today.  Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s 
ostensible rejection of the “concrete expectations of [the framers]” 
as the appropriate guide for the original meaning,289 he relied 
explicitly and dispositively on those expectations in assessing the 
constitutionality of capital punishment.  This is in stark contrast 
to his apparent view that practices that the framers of the 
                                                                                                               
 282 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
 283 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 284 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 285 Scalia, supra note 276, at 145. 
 286 Id.  
 287 Id. 
 288 Id. at 146. 
 289 Id. at 144. 
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Fourteenth Amendment believed were permissible—such as 
segregated schools and race-conscious remedial legislation—are 
now unconstitutional because the abstract principle that animates 
the text applies differently now than it would have then. 
Justice Scalia was not alone among the Justices in shifting the 
level of generality at which he sought constitutional meaning.  
Justice Thomas has also implicitly contended that Brown was 
consistent with—indeed, required by—the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,290 and that race-conscious programs 
designed to benefit racial minorities are inconsistent with the 
Amendment’s original meaning.291  Like Justice Scalia, Justice 
Thomas has apparently been willing to seek the original meaning 
for resolving those questions at a high level of generality, 
reasoning that the “Constitution enshrines principles independent 
of social theories.”292  He has also taken a broad view of the First 
Amendment’s protection for commercial speech, concluding 
(notwithstanding the conventional view that the framers did not 
believe that the Amendment protected commercial speech)293 that 
he does “not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting 
that ‘commercial’ speech is of ‘lower value’ than ‘noncommercial’ 
speech.”294   
                                                                                                               
 290 Justice Thomas suggested in his concurring opinion in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 that the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
distinguish between “measures to keep the races together” and “measures to keep the races 
apart,” and that the “Constitution is not [so] malleable” as to permit the 
constitutionalization of “today’s faddish social theories that embrace that distinction.” 551 
U.S. 701, 780 (2007) (Thomas, J. concurring).  Justice Thomas then cited Justice Harlan’s 
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), to support 
the assertion that the “Constitution enshrines principles independent of social theories.”  
Id.   
 291 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2428 (2013) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“The Equal Protection Clause strips States of all authority to use race as a 
factor in providing education.”).   
 292 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 780 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 293 See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN 
HISTORY 248 (1963) (“[W]e do not know what the First Amendment’s freedom of speech-and-
press clause meant to the men who drafted and ratified it at the time they do so.  Moreover, 
they themselves . . . possessed no clear understanding either.”); Bork, supra note 98, at 22 
(“The framers seem to have had no coherent theory of free speech and appear not to have 
been overly concerned with the subject.”). 
 294 44 Liquormart, Inc. v Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
Justice Thomas somewhat tentatively noted that “some historical materials suggest” 
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But Justice Thomas has sought the original meaning of the 
First Amendment at a much lower level of generality in seeking to 
determine whether state regulation of the sale of violent video 
games to minors interferes with the freedom of speech.  In Brown 
v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,295 he concluded that “[t]he 
practices and beliefs of the founding generation establish that ‘the 
freedom of speech,’ as originally understood, does not include a 
right to speak to minors (or a right of minors to access speech) 
without going through the minors’ parents or guardians.”296  He 
relied on historical evidence that, in his view, demonstrated that 
“the founding generation believed parents had absolute authority 
over their minor children and expected parents to use that 
authority to direct the proper development of their children.”297  
Justice Thomas concluded that it “would be absurd to suggest that 
such a society understood ‘the freedom of speech’ to include a right 
to speak to minors (or a corresponding right of minors to access 
speech) without going through the minors’ parents.”298  According 
to this reasoning, the First Amendment does not provide 
                                                                                                               
commercial speech has the same status under the Amendment as other speech, and he cited 
three cases and a statement by Benjamin Franklin to support that position.  Id. 
  Justice Thomas also tentatively suggested, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 
742 (2010), that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment might 
protect unenumerated rights.  See id. at 854 (“The mere fact that the [Privileges or 
Immunities] Clause does not expressly list the rights it protects does not render it incapable 
of principled judicial application.”).  Although he conceded that this possibility “may 
produce hard questions,” he noted that the “Constitution contains many provisions that 
require an examination of more than just constitutional text to determine whether a 
particular act is within Congress’ power or is otherwise prohibited,” and he reasoned that 
“[w]hen the inquiry focuses on what the ratifying era understood the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause to mean, interpreting it should be no more ‘hazardous’ than interpreting 
these other constitutional provisions by using the same approach.”  Id.  It is not entirely 
clear from Justice Thomas’s opinion, but it seems likely that he was suggesting that an 
unenumerated right would have to have been specifically recognized at the time of the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment as a fundamental right in order to be entitled to 
protection today under the Clause.  Cf. id. at 858 (concluding that “the record makes plain 
that the Framers of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the ratifying-era 
public . . . . deemed [the right to keep and bear arms] necessary to include in the minimum 
baseline of federal rights that the Privileges or Immunities Clause established in the wake 
of the War over slavery”). 
 295 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 296 Id. at 2751 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 297 Id. at 2752. 
 298 Id. 
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protection today for activity that the “founding generation would 
not have considered [to be] an abridgment of ‘the freedom of 
speech.’ ”299  
Justice Thomas took a similar approach to the constitutionality 
under the Due Process Clause of bans on same-sex marriage.  He 
sought to answer the question by assigning a narrow meaning to 
the term “liberty” in the Due Process Clauses.  He contended that 
“[s]ince well before 1787, liberty has been understood as freedom 
from government action, not entitlement to government benefits,” 
and that the “Framers created our Constitution to preserve that 
understanding of liberty.”300  In his view, the term “liberty” most 
likely referred “only to freedom from physical restraint,”301 and at 
most meant “individual freedom from governmental action, not as 
a right to a particular governmental entitlement.”302  Because a 
state’s refusal to acknowledge a marriage does not involve any 
restraint on private action, Justice Thomas reasoned, such action 
by the state does not impermissibly interfere with the liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause.303 
Similarly, Justice Thomas has sought the original meaning of 
the Commerce Clause at a low level of generality.  In his 
concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez,304 he urged the Court 
to consider an approach “more faithful to the original 
understanding” of the Clause.305  He stressed that “at the time the 
original Constitution was ratified, ‘commerce’ consisted of selling, 
buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these 
purposes,”306 and he warned that “interjecting a modern sense of 
commerce into the Constitution generates significant textual and 
structural problems.”307  Because the “Founding Fathers confirmed 
that most areas of life (even many matters that would have 
substantial effects on commerce) would remain outside the reach 
                                                                                                               
 299 Id.  
 300 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 301 Id. at 2633. 
 302 Id. at 2634 (emphasis omitted). 
 303 See id. at 2635–37. 
 304 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 305 Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 306 Id. at 585. 
 307 Id. at 587. 
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of the Federal Government,”308 we should understand such 
matters to be outside of the reach of the commerce power today.309  
When the question is the scope of Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause, in other words, Justice Thomas does not seek 
the principle that underlies the term “commerce” and then 
endeavor to apply it to modern circumstances; he seeks both the 
framers’ definition of the term and their understanding of how it 
would apply, notwithstanding changes that they could not have 
foreseen.   
Other prominent originalists have also varied the level of 
generality at which they seek the original meaning in ways that 
cannot obviously be explained by the level of generality at which 
the constitutional text is expressed.  For example, as discussed 
above, Steven Calabresi has sought the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment at a high level of generality when 
considering the Amendment’s treatment of discrimination on the 
basis of race, gender, and sexual orientation and the Amendment’s 
protection for the right to marry.310  Indeed, he went so far as to 
describe as “faux originalists” those originalists who believe that 
the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit sex 
discrimination,311 presumably because they improperly read the 
Amendment at too narrow a level of generality.  But when the 
question is the regulation of abortion—a matter on which he has 
confessed to holding very strong views312—he seeks constitutional 
meaning at a much lower level of generality.  Rather than ask, for 
example, whether the Fourteenth Amendment, through its 
protection for fundamental rights,313 embraces a right to decide 
when or whether to start a family, Calabresi asks whether a right 
to “abortion on demand” is either “deeply rooted in history and 
                                                                                                               
 308 Id. at 590. 
 309 See id. at 593 (declaring that we must “respect a constitutional line that does not grant 
Congress power over all that substantially affects interstate commerce”). 
 310 See supra notes 115–121, 147–164, 169 and accompanying text. 
 311 See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 151, at 101. 
 312 See Steven G. Calabresi, How To Reverse Government Imposition of Immorality: A 
Strategy for Eroding Roe v. Wade, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85, 85 (2008) (describing 
abortion as a “loathsome procedure” and stating that “Roe v. Wade was “not merely wrongly 
decided,” but “also profoundly immoral”). 
 313 See Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 115, at 1413–20 (analyzing the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
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tradition” or supported by enough states today to constitute an 
“Article V consensus of three-quarters of the States.”314  Similarly, 
whereas Randy Barnett seeks the original meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment at a sufficiently high level of generality to 
authorize judges to “supplement” the text by recognizing rights 
entitled to protection315— including the right of same-sex partners 
to engage in consensual sex at home316 and the freedom of 
contract317—he has, like Justice Thomas, sought the original 
meaning of the Commerce Clause at a much lower level of 
generality.318 
So much for the constraining power of originalism.  We can 
produce radically different answers to questions of constitutional 
law simply by modifying the level of generality at which we ask 
the questions.  If originalists continue to coalesce around the 
principles of the new originalism, then originalism’s capacity to 
constrain will continue to diminish—and, conversely, originalism’s 
capacity to generate a wide range of plausible answers to 
questions of constitutional law will continue to increase.319 
Perhaps more important, the growing tendency of originalists to 
seek the original meaning at a high level of generality is tending 
(presumably much to the chagrin of those who were in the 
vanguard of the old originalism in the 1970s and 1980s) to collapse 
the distinction between originalism and non-originalism.  This is 
not necessarily a bad thing as a matter of theory, but it might have 
distorting effects for our constitutional culture.  
Non-originalism obviously is not one cohesive theory, but rather 
a collection of theories that reject the assertion that we must 
                                                                                                               
 314 Calabresi, Equal Justice, supra note 99, at 154. 
 315 BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 123. 
 316 See Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
429, 495 (2004) (“By the theory of the police power presented here, Lawrence v. Texas, 
is . . . easy case.”). 
 317 See BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 211–19. 
 318 See id. at 278–318; Barnett, supra note 239, at 146 (“The most persuasive evidence of 
original meaning . . . strongly supports . . . [a] narrow interpretation of Congress’ 
[Commerce Clause] power . . . .”). 
 319 See Colby & Smith, supra note 24, at 300 (“[T]he wide range of competing versions of 
originalism enables self-professed orginalists to reach, while applying ostensibly originalist 
methodology, virtually any result that they wish to reach.”). 
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always be bound by the narrow original understanding of the 
constitutional text.320  But non-originalists—or living 
constitutionalists, as they used to be called—do not simply ignore 
text and history in assigning constitutional meaning.  As I have 
noted elsewhere, for most non-originalists, the original meaning of 
the text provides the starting point for any act of constitutional 
interpretation.321  Few non-originalists, for example, would 
contend that a twenty-five-year-old person is eligible to serve as 
President—or, conversely, that the Constitution should be read 
today to prevent anyone under the age of fifty from serving as 
President.322  But because of the broad level of generality at which 
much of the constitutional text is expressed, the text alone rarely 
resolves constitutional questions.323  Non-originalists also 
generally do not feel constrained by the specific expectations of the 
framers in deciding how to apply the principle embodied in the 
text to modern circumstances.   
Accordingly, when Justice Brennan gave a speech in 1986 to the 
Federalist Society criticizing originalism, he lamented those “who 
would restrict claims of right to the values of 1789 specifically 
articulated in the Constitution” and who “turn a blind eye to social 
progress and eschew adaptation of overarching principles to 
changes of social circumstance.”324  His approach, in contrast, 
accepted the framers’ “fundamental principles” but refused to be 
bound by the “precise, at times anachronistic, contours” of those 
principles.325  To Justice Brennan, recognizing that “the genius of 
the Constitution” lies in “the adaptability of its great principles to 
                                                                                                               
 320 See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 24 (2009) (defining 
non-originalism as the “thesis that facts that occur after ratification or amendment can 
properly bear—constitutively, not just evidentially—on how courts should interpret the 
Constitution . . .”). 
 321 See Smith, supra note 34, at 723 (noting that originalists use the original meaning as 
“the starting point” for interpretation). 
 322 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (providing that no person shall “be eligible to the 
Office of President . . . who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years . . .”). 
 323 See Smith, supra note 34, at 723 (“[O]riginal meaning . . . rarely alone provides the 
conclusion.”). 
 324 William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium at Georgetown 
University (Oct. 12, 1985), reprinted in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 55–
57 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007).  I am indebted to my colleague Orin Kerr, who brought 
this speech to my attention. 
 325 Id. at 61. 
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cope with current problems and current needs” necessarily 
entailed the rejection of originalism.326 
And yet this was, essentially, Bork’s approach to the question of 
racial segregation, to take the example with which we began our 
discussion. Bork criticized the Court for relying on a non-
originalist rationale in Brown,327 reasoning that the Court’s self-
conscious rejection in Brown of originalism328 not only was wrong, 
but also had a “calamitous effect upon the law” precisely because it 
purported to depart from the original meaning.329  But even if Bork 
was correct that the opinion in Brown would have gained 
legitimacy by being clearly “rooted in the original 
understanding,”330 it is far from clear that Bork’s approach—
which, again, focused on the demands of “equality”—was 
meaningfully different from the Court’s actual approach, which 
ultimately concluded that, “in . . . light of [public education’s] full 
development and its present place in American life,” segregated 
schools were unconstitutional because “[s]eparate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal.”331  Indeed, as we have seen, 
Bork’s approach would justify all sorts of open-ended 
interpretation in the name of “equality,” including many with 
which, it is safe to say, Bork would have expressed strong 
disagreement.332   
Yet the examples discussed above suggest that Bork’s approach 
to Brown is no longer an outlier in originalist circles.  If all 
originalism entails today is a commitment to the ideas that 
constitutional meaning was fixed at the time of ratification and 
                                                                                                               
 326 Id. 
 327 See BORK, supra note 12, at 77, 83 (stating that the Court in Brown issued “a ruling 
based on nothing in the historic Constitution,” which subsequently encouraged the Court “to 
embark on more adventures in policymaking, which is what it thought it had done in 
Brown”). 
 328 347 U.S. 483, 492 (“[W]e cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was 
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.”). 
 329 BORK, supra note 12, at 76. 
 330 Id. at 83. 
 331 Brown, 347 U.S. at 492, 495. 
 332 Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 432 n.25 (1997) (“If achieving 
‘equality’ is the relevant intention, it would be equally originalist to say that the Fourteenth 
Amendment enacted Marxism, on the theory that equality and capitalism were mutually 
inconsistent, though the ratifiers did not understand that.”). 
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/17 1:54 PM 
68  GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1 
 
that judges are bound by that meaning,333 with the recognition 
that in many cases the meaning was fixed only at a very high level 
of generality, then there is no longer anything particularly 
distinctive about originalism.334   
In a provocative paper, for example, Will Baude argues that 
“originalism is our law”; but he can do so—and accommodate many 
Supreme Court decisions that an earlier generation of originalists 
either decried or regretfully concluded were indefensible on 
originalist grounds—only because his definition of what 
originalism entails is so capacious.335  Similarly, Jack Balkin has 
sought expressly to merge, under the banner of “Living 
Originalism,” what were once thought to be competing approaches 
to interpretation.336  But it turns out that this was not a 
particularly challenging move, given how much originalists have 
repudiated about the old form of originalism. 
It is in this light that we should understand Elena Kagan’s 
comments about originalism during the hearings on her 
nomination to serve as Associate Justice.  When asked about the 
framers, Kagan declared, “Sometimes they laid down very specific 
rules.  Sometimes they laid down broad principles.  Either way, we 
apply what they tried to do.  In that way, we are all 
                                                                                                               
 333 See Solum, Construction, supra note 32, at 456 (describing the “Fixation Thesis” and 
the “Constraint Principle” as the “two core ideas” of originalist theories). 
 334 See Orin Kerr, More on Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/29/mor 
e-on-orginalism-and-same-sex-marriage/ (“If we accept the full range of what today’s 
theorists say, it no longer makes sense to ask whether there is an originalist argument for a 
position.  There are now originalist arguments for everything.”); Orin Kerr, Is There an 
Originalist Case for a Right to Same-Sex Marriage?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 28, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/28/is-there-an-original 
ist-case-for-a-right-to-same-sex-marriage/ (nothing that to make an originalist claim 
“identifiably different” from a non-originalist one, there would need to be evidence that “the 
level of generality actually identified and applied” was the same as that understood by the 
framers). 
 335 William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2403 (2015) 
(defining “inclusive originalism” as an approach under which “the original meaning of the 
Constitution is the ultimate criterion for constitutional law,” and under which “judges can 
look to precedent, policy, or practice, but only to the extent that the original meaning 
incorporates or permits them”) (emphasis omitted). 
 336 See BALKIN, supra note 105, at 3–34. 
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originalists.”337  But Justice Kagan could make this assertion in 
good faith only because the version of originalism most often 
advanced by scholars is slowly becoming what most of us think of 
as non-originalism.  Justice Kagan could just as easily have 
declared, it turns out, that we are all non-originalists now. 
This is not to say that the old originalists had it right.  Quite to 
the contrary, the old originalism suffered from very serious 
problems, including the fact that it could not justify some of our 
most deeply valued norms of constitutional law.  But at least 
under the old originalism, we usually knew (more or less) where 
we stood.  Under the old originalism, for example, Roe was 
wrong,338 but so was Lochner.339  Under the new originalism, 
perhaps both are still wrong;340 or perhaps Roe was right but 
Lochner was wrong;341 or perhaps Roe was wrong but Lochner was 
                                                                                                               
 337 Kagan: We Are All Originalists, THE BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (June 29, 2010), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/06/Kagan-we-are-all-orginalists.html. 
 338 See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 185, at 2 (“[T]he Supreme Court 
has . . . created out of whole cloth . . . a ‘right of privacy,’ a ‘right’ the Court used to 
invalidate . . . the abortion laws of all 50 states.”); see also William H. Rehnquist, The 
Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 695 (1976) (criticizing the view under 
which “nonelected members of the federal judiciary may address themselves to a social 
problem simply because other branches of government have failed or refused to do so”).  
 339 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 12, at 266 (“The logic that bars the one equally bars the 
other.”); BORK, supra note 12, at 43 (“[S]ubstantive due process, wherever it appears, is 
never more than a pretense that the judge’s views are in the Constitution.”); OFFICE OF 
LEGAL POLICY, supra note 185, at 59 (“To justify its promotion of a laissez-faire marketplace 
[in the Lochner era], the Court purported to rely on the due process clauses of the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments, but it never seriously attempted to justify its expansive 
interpretation of those clauses with their original meaning.”).  This is not to say, however, 
that there was not a plausible defense of Lochner under the old originalism.  See, e.g., 
Bernard H. Siegan, Rehabilitating Lochner, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 453, 454, 492–97 (1985) 
(arguing that Lochner was consistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 340 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Text vs. Precedent in Constitutional Law, 31 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 947, 952 (2008) (“The Supreme Court abandoned the Lochner-era doctrine of 
economic substantive due process in the face of a withering textualist and originalist 
critique . . . .”); id. at 957 (“Is it more important to the rule of law to maintain abortion 
rights or more important to get rid of the doctrine of substantive due process, which led to 
Dred Scott v. Sandford and to Lochner v. New York? In constitutional law, one ought to take 
the long view.”). 
 341 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 223, at 292 (offering “an argument for the right to abortion 
based on the original meaning of the constitutional text as opposed to its original expected 
application”); Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional 
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 679–80 (2005) (suggesting that although there is a 
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right;342 or perhaps they were both right.343  All we have to do is 
alter the level of generality at which we seek the original meaning, 
and we can construct a plausible argument for any of those 
results—or, for that matter, for almost anything.   
There is an irony in this state of affairs.  Modern originalism 
arose in direct response to the broad rights-granting decisions of 
the Warren and Burger Courts.344  “Above all, originalism was a 
way of explaining what the Court had done wrong, and what it had 
done wrong in this context was primarily to strike down 
government actions in the name of individual rights”345—and in 
particular, individual rights that were not specifically mentioned 
in the text or specifically contemplated by the framers.  But the 
new originalism’s embrace of the practice of seeking constitutional 
meaning at a high level of generality means that almost anything 
goes now, even for originalists.  
Yet the problem goes beyond irony.  The source of originalism’s 
appeal, particularly outside of the legal academy, has long been its 
claim to neutrality.346  On this view, because originalism “lash[es] 
judges to the solid mast of history,”347 it is “less likely to aggravate 
                                                                                                               
plausible claim that Lochner was correct when it was decided, based on the intellectual 
assumptions of the time, our legal culture has changed enough that it is now wrong).   
 342 See, e.g., Edward Whelan, Rand Paul is Wrong: Judicial Restraint is Right, NAT’L REV. 
(Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/396480/rand-paul-wrong-judicial-rest 
raint-right-ed-whelan (“The core of judicial activism consists of the wrongful overriding by 
judges of democratic enactments or other policy choices made through the processes of 
representative government.  Roe v. Wade, with its invention of a constitutional right to 
abortion, is a classic example.”); Ed Whelan, Re: Does the Constitution Protect 
Unenumerated Rights?, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 18, 2012) (stating that it is “quite plausible” that 
“the Privileges or Immunities Clause, properly construed, does protect some substantive, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/296482/re-does-constitution-protect-unenume 
rated-rights-ed-whelan (stating that it is “quite plausible” that “the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, properly construed, does protect some substantive economic rights”). 
 343 See, e.g., BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 259–66 (constructing an originalist 
argument for a constitutionally protected “presumption of liberty” against legislative 
interference); Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 411 
(2007) (“I am sympathetic with [Balkin’s] conclusions about the unconstitutionality of 
prohibitions on abortion.”). 
 344 See Whittington, supra note 10, at 601 (“[O]riginalism was a reactive theory motivated 
by substantive disagreement with . . . the Warren and Burger Courts. . . .”). 
 345 Id. 
 346 See McConnell, supra note 36, at 2415 (arguing that originalism is objective rather 
than ideological). 
 347 Whittington, supra note 10, at 602. 
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the most significant weakness of the system of judicial review,” 
which is the risk that “the judges will mistake their own 
predilections for the law.”348  Approaches to constitutional 
interpretation that do not tie judges to the historical meaning of 
the Constitution, in contrast, simply invite judges to impose their 
own policy preferences under the guise of interpretation.349  But 
originalists’ increasing willingness to seek constitutional meaning 
at a high level of generality largely frees judges from the 
constraint of history.  And, as we have seen, the freedom to vary 
the level of generality while still claiming fidelity to originalism 
tends to make originalism seem significantly less neutral.350 
More important, although academic originalists have gone a 
long way towards making originalism attractive even to those who 
were deeply skeptical of the old originalism, judges remain free to 
apply some version of the old originalism when they are so moved.  
As Tom Colby has explained, originalists can accept some of the 
new originalism’s modifications to the old originalism while 
rejecting—or “more often simply not acknowledging or engaging”—
others; or worse, they can claim to accept those changes in theory, 
“but then turn around and not actually employ them in 
practice.”351  The examples discussed above suggest that this 
happens regularly. 
In addition, the popular conception of originalism remains 
something much more like the old originalism.352  That conception 
is based on what Larry Alexander has self-deprecatingly described 
                                                                                                               
 348 Scalia, supra note 243, at 863. 
 349 See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 36, at 286 (“Integrity characterizes a judicial process based 
on originalism, and its lack is one of the chief deficiencies of its alternatives.”); id. at 288 
(arguing that the “impersonality” of originalism’s decision-making criteria “invokes all the 
virtues of objectivity and by implication rejects subjective judging,” and criticizing the “often 
arbitrary, partisan, subjective criteria of nonoriginalists”). 
 350 See supra notes 244–254 and accompanying text. 
 351 Colby, supra note 18, at 772; see also Dorf, supra note 124, at 937–38 (“[D]espite the 
shift in academic defenses of originalism, judges and others continue to invoke the older, 
more simple-minded expected-applications version of originalism.”). 
 352 See Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2022–23 
(2012) (reviewing both JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011)); DAVID A. STRAUSS, 
THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010)) (“The available evidence indicates that members of the 
public at large hold views about originalism, but they do not sharply distinguish among 
original intent, original expected application, and original semantic meaning.”). 
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as “simple-minded originalism,”353 and it derives much of its 
appeal from the idea that by adhering to the specific intent of the 
framers, judges can avoid “legislating from the bench.”354  To be 
sure, the claim that judges who follow this approach can effectively 
limit their role to that of “umpire”355 might be fanciful to most 
people who are engaged with constitutional law, but it is a 
metaphor with great resonance outside of our world. 
Originalism acquires an additional veneer of respectability in 
the popular conception when the work of new originalists 
purporting to justify Brown and the Court’s decisions on sex 
discrimination and the right of privacy trickles in to the public 
discourse over the proper way to interpret the Constitution.  But 
in practice—particularly in judicial practice, with respect to new 
questions that arise—judges are free to follow the more narrow, 
popular conception of originalism and seek the original meaning at 
a low level of generality.356  This enables originalists to continue to 
claim, in public debates over how to interpret the Constitution, 
that only their approach to constitutional interpretation is 
genuinely neutral, while avoiding the taint that assuredly would 
attach to their approach with the admission that it cannot, in fact, 
justify many of our most prized norms of constitutional law.  
Sooner or later, originalists will have to choose. 
 
                                                                                                               
 353 See Alexander, supra note 32, at 1 (noting that “simple-minded originalism,” which 
seeks the “authors’ intended meaning,” is “considered heretical among most legal 
academics” but is “so orthodox among ordinary folks as to escape notice”). 
 354 Whittington, supra note 10, at 601 (internal quotation marks omitted); see JOHNATHAN 
O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 96 
(2005) (quoting President Nixon, who insisted that it was “the job of the courts to interpret 
the law, not to make the law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 355 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of 
the United States, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be 
C.J. of the United States). 
 356 See Dorf, supra note 352, at 2014 (“Widespread acceptance of Balkin’s views would 
allow conservatives to say that even liberals now accept originalism but then turn around 
and defined originalism narrowly.” (footnotes omitted)). 
